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BIG DATA BLACKLISTING
Margaret Hu
Abstract
“Big data blacklisting” is the process of categorizing individuals as
administratively “guilty until proven innocent” by virtue of
suspicious digital data and database screening results. Database screening
and digital watchlisting systems are increasingly used to determine
who can work, vote, fly, etc. In a big data world, through the
deployment of these big data tools, both substantive and procedural due
process protections may be threatened in new and nearly invisible ways.
Substantive due process rights safeguard fundamental liberty interests.
Procedural due process rights prevent arbitrary deprivations by
the
government
of constitutionally protected interests. This
Article frames the increasing digital mediation of rights and
privileges through government-led big data programs as a
constitutional harm under substantive due process, and identifies the
obstruction of core liberties with big data tools as rapidly evolving and
systemic.
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To illustrate the mass scale and unprecedented nature of the big data
blacklisting phenomenon, this Article undertakes a significant descriptive
burden to introduce and contextualize big data blacklisting programs.
Through this descriptive effort, this Article explores how a commonality
of big data harms may be associated with nonclassified big data
programs, such as the No Work List and No Vote List—programs that
the government uses to establish or deny an individual’s eligibility for
certain benefits or rights through database screening. The big data
blacklisting harms of big data tools to make eligibility decisions are not,
of course, limited to nonclassified programs. This Article also suggests
how the same consequences may be at play with classified and semiclassified big data programs such as the Terrorist Watchlist and No Fly
List. This Article concludes that big data blacklisting harms interfere with
and obstruct fundamental liberty interests in a way that now necessitates
an evolution of the existing due process jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article addresses an emerging constitutional harm in the digital
age: the mass “blacklisting”1 of individuals through the development and
adoption of governance tools that rely upon the technologies of big data.2
1. The term “blacklist” is defined as “a list of persons or organizations under suspicion, or
considered untrustworthy, disloyal, etc, [especially] one compiled by a government or an
organization.” COLLINS ENGLISH DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2012). The concept of “blacklisting” is
often associated with 1950s-era McCarthyism. See, e.g., ELLEN SCHRECKER, THE AGE OF
MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS 92–93 (1994) (explaining that McCarthy-era
blacklisting consequences were often economic in nature, leading to unemployment; yet, “[t]he
blacklist took a personal toll as well. Broken health and broken marriages, even suicides were not
unknown.”). Several scholars and experts have analogized the blacklisting practices of the prior
historic era with contemporary terrorism prevention practices. See, e.g., JEFFREY KAHN, MRS.
SHIPLEY’S GHOST: THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND TERRORIST WATCHLISTS 8 (2013) (comparing U.S.
passport and travel restrictions during the McCarthy era with the No Fly List restrictions after
9/11, and concluding that “[t]he mistakes of the mid-twentieth century are being remade at the
start of the twenty-first century”); David Cole, The Difference Prevention Makes: Regulating
Preventive Justice, 9 CRIM. LAW & PHIL. 501 (2015) (discussing legal rules that remain in effect
that “reflect lessons learned from the McCarthy era, in which thousands of innocent citizens were
caught up in the preventive frenzy of anti-communism”) (citing Geoffrey Stone, PERILOUS TIMES:
FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 311–426
(2004)); Aaron H. Caplan, Nonattainder as a Liberty Interest, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1203, 1205–06
(describing the No Fly List and other government efforts to target suspicious individuals or
suspicious behaviors as contemporary “government blacklists” and “blacklisting” programs);
Daniel J. Steinbock, Designating the Dangerous: From Blacklists to Watch Lists, 30 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 65, 68 (2006) (“It is, therefore, time to ask if something equivalent to the blacklists of
fifty years ago is happening again, and, if so, how the twenty-first century use of watch lists [in
the post-9/11 counter-terrorism context] might or might not resemble the blacklisting of the
McCarthy era.”).
2. “Big data” is difficult to define, as it is a newly evolving field and the technologies that
it encompasses are evolving rapidly as well. See generally VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER &
KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND
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Specifically, “big data blacklisting”3 describes the harm incurred by those
categorized by the government as administratively “guilty until proven
innocent” by virtue of digitally generated suspicion, such as through
government-led big data systems that flag suspicious digital data and
database screening results.4 Those who may be digitally blacklisted
include anyone with a digital trail or a presence within a database.
Big data blacklisting harms result from the mediation of and
interference with fundamental liberty interests. Additionally, as this
Article illustrates, those tracked and isolated for action by governmentled big data blacklisting programs often have limited to nonexistent
options to remediate or may face consequences without any knowledge
of the big data blacklisting program that impacts them.5 People in this
THINK (2013). Thus, some experts have explained that “‘Big Data’ is a generalized, imprecise
term that refers to the use of large data sets in data science and predictive analytics.” Kate
Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to Redress
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 96 (2014). “Technologists often use the technical
‘3-V’ definition of big data as ‘high-volume, high-velocity and high-variety information assets
that demand cost-effective, innovative forms of information processing for enhanced insight and
decision making.’” Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 393, 394 (2014) (quoting IT Glossary: Big Data, GARTNER, http://www.gartner.com/itglossary/big-data/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2015)); see id. (citing Doug Laney, 3D Data Management:
Controlling Data Volume, Velocity, and Variety, GARTNER (Feb. 6, 2001), http://blogs.gartner.
com/doug-laney/files/2012/01/ad949-3D-Data-Management-Controlling-Data-Volume-Velocity
-and-Variety.pdf). Multiple authors have addressed the characteristics of “big data” and the
challenges posed by big data technologies. See infra Part I.A.
3. The use of the term “blacklisting” in the media to describe the consequences of digital
watchlisting appears to demonstrate a wider public acknowledgement of and public discourse on
the potential consequences of such watchlisting. See, e.g., Meghan Keneally, Secret Blacklist
Stopping Muslim Residents from Becoming Citizen, Lawsuit Claims, ABC NEWS (Aug. 12, 2014,
6:08
AM),
http://abcnews.go.com/US/secret-blacklist-stopping-muslim-residents-citizenslawsuit-claims/story?id=24910447; Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux, Blacklisted: The Secret
Government Rulebook for Labeling You a Terrorist, INTERCEPT (July 23, 2014, 2:45 PM),
https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/07/23/blacklisted/; Gail Sullivan, Why the No-Fly List Was
Declared Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (June 25, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/25/judge-rules-no-fly-list-unconstitutional/ (“Imagine you’re in
an airport en route to visit family abroad when suddenly you’re surrounded. Then you are detained
and interrogated. You not only miss your scheduled flight, but can’t get on any other
flight. . . . And nobody will tell you why. It’s as though you’ve been blacklisted.”).
4. See infra Part III.C.
5. Various plaintiffs have alleged in litigation that constitutional harms arise from big data
watchlisting and dataveillance–cybersurveillance targeting systems, including database screening
systems. Afifi v. Lynch, No. 11-0460(BAH), 2015 WL 1941420, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 2015)
(GPS tracking litigation alleging, inter alia, a Fourth Amendment violation); Latif v. Holder, 686
F.3d 1122, 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012) (No Fly List litigation by plaintiffs alleging, inter alia, due
process violations); Complaint at 1–2, Makowski v. Holder, No. 12-cv-05265 (N.D. Ill. July 3,
2012) (Secure Communities (S-COMM) litigation by plaintiff alleging, inter alia, a violation of
the Privacy Act); Ariz. Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Napolitano, 526 F. Supp. 2d 968, 977 (D. Ariz.
2007), aff’d sub nom. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) (E-Verify
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category include, most prominently, those who find themselves on a
government digital watchlisting program or in a database screening
system. These programs rely upon a big data approach to policy making:
the incorporation of big data tools into programs that may include mass
data collection,6 data mining,7 mass digital indexing,8 database screening
protocols,9 digital watchlisting,10 big data integration,11 and predictive
analytics.12
litigation by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, et al., alleging, inter alia, Fourth Amendment
violation through search and seizure of data).
6. See, e.g., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES,
P RESERVING V ALUES 5 (2014) [hereinafter P ODESTA REPORT], available at https://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf (“[D]ata collection
and analysis is being conducted at a velocity that is increasingly approaching real time, which
means there is a growing potential for big data analytics to have an immediate effect on a person’s
surrounding environment or decisions being made about his or her life.”).
7. The nature of the impact of government data mining has formed the basis of extensive
and important research in recent years. See, e.g., Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The
Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435, 437 (2008); Christopher Slobogin,
Government Data Mining and the Fourth Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 321 (2008); Daniel
J. Solove, Data Mining and the Security-Liberty Debate, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 343, 343–44 (2008).
8. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1107 (2002) (“[B]y obtaining private sector records, the
government can conduct the type of ‘fishing expeditions’ that the Framers feared.”).
9. See, e.g., SIMSON GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY 43–59 (2000) (discussing the history of the use of data markers through computerization
that increasingly allows for government identification of one individual against others through
database screening of, for example, digitalized fingerprints and DNA); MARTIN KUHN, FEDERAL
DATAVEILLANCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROTECTIONS 2–6 (2007)
(examining constitutional implications of “knowledge discovery in databases” (KDD
applications) through dataveillance).
10. See, e.g., Sharon Bradford Franklin & Sarah Holcomb, Watching the Watch Lists:
Maintaining Security and Liberty in America, HUM. RTS., Summer 2007, at 18; KAHN, supra note
1; WILLIAM J. KROUSE & BART ELIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33645, TERRORIST WATCHLIST
CHECKS AND AIR PASSENGER PRESCREENING (2009); Anya Bernstein, The Hidden Costs of
Terrorist Watch Lists, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 461, 466 (2013); Peter M. Shane, The Bureaucratic Due
Process of Government Watch Lists, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 804, 809–10 (2007) (“It ought to be
viewed as intolerable in a democratic society for large numbers of innocent citizens to suffer
stigmatic government action under a largely secret program, even if such cases can be ‘redressed’
through individual review.”); Steinbock, supra note 1, at 78; Susan Stellin, Who Is Watching the
Watch Lists?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/01/sundayreview/who-is-watching-the-watch-lists.html.
11. Xin Luna Dong & Divesh Srivastava, Big Data Integration, 6 PROC. OF VERY LARGE
DATA BASES [VLDB] ENDOWMENT 1188, 1189 (describing multiple technologies that assist in big
data integration techniques, including schema mapping, record linkage, data fusion, and big data
architecture), available at http://www.vldb.org/pvldb/vol6/p1188-srivastava.pdf.
12. See, e.g., STEVEN FINLAY, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS, DATA MINING AND BIG DATA:
MYTHS, MISCONCEPTIONS, AND METHODS 3 (2014) (explaining that tools of predictive analytics
are not only deployed by the private and commercial sectors, but that “government and other nonprofit organizations also have reasons for wanting to know how people are going to behave and
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Thus, the interrelationship between various government big data
programs, which may on their face appear wholly unrelated, deserves
close interrogation. Big data technologies utilized by the government can
create a commonality of big data consequences. This Article shows how
constitutional harms may attach to this commonality of big data
consequences. These big data programs should be viewed collectively
and not individually to better understand these consequences. These
consequences often afford limited, inadequate, and impractical legal
recourse for those impacted by big data-generated inferential guilt or by
the type of heightened suspicion that big data technologies can facilitate,
as well as for those who find themselves harmed by these digital
watchlisting and database screening programs.
It is important to note that big data blacklisting consequences are not
limited to programs operating in the public sphere, and remedies may not
be restricted to those available in public law.13 Yet, because this Article
focuses on constitutional concerns, it does not attempt to address private
big data blacklisting harms. Additionally, while critical of governmental
big data cybersurveillance and mass dataveillance systems and methods,
this Article is not a blanket rejection of big data tools. Legitimate and
valuable uses for big data tools exist in many important contexts.
Introducing the phenomenon of big data blacklisting and its
consequences presents other inherent challenges. The phenomenon is
new and technologically derived; therefore, it requires a significant
descriptive effort to establish the contours of the phenomenon in the first
instance. Consequently, this Article includes neither the detail of
programmatic description nor the specificity of legal analysis that would
be achievable if one chose to critique each program separately. A
collective critique of the big data impact of multiple big data blacklisting
programs is limited to a discussion as practicable within a single Article.

then taking action to change or prevent it”); ERIC SIEGEL, PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS: THE POWER TO
PREDICT WHO WILL CLICK, BUY, LIE, OR DIE 59–60 (2013) (discussing predictive policing
methods); NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL—BUT
SOME DON’T 417–18 (2012) (discussing governmental efforts to isolate relevant signals in
correcting the failed attempts to prevent the terrorist attacks of 9/11: “In cases like these, what
matters is not our signal detection capabilities . . . . We need signal analysis capabilities to isolate
the pertinent signals from the echo chamber.”).
13. See, e.g., FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 101–03 (2015) (describing
private credit scoring regimes and computerization of the finance sector); Danielle Keats Citron
& Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 3–4 (2014) [hereinafter Citron & Pasquale, The Scored Society] (discussing algorithmic
and scoring systems implemented by various individuals or companies that use data to make
decisions on characterizing a person in numerous aspects of society).
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Moreover, analyzing these programs—many of which are classified
or semi-classified14 and may rely upon largely undisclosed policies and
big data technologies, such as undisclosed algorithms—entails an
unavoidable degree of speculation. But understanding big data
blacklisting as a liberty-depriving constitutional harm necessitates a
collective critique of multiple programs. As a result, this Article
undertakes a significant descriptive burden to provide the necessary
backdrop to begin conceptualizing a legal framework capable of
remediating big data blacklisting consequences. Within that framework,
this Article proposes that a substantive due process analysis is more
appropriate than a procedural due process analysis, which may appear to
be the most obvious remedial method.
This Article simply poses the question of whether freedom from big
data blacklisting harms should be a cognizable fundamental liberty
interest. If courts recognized such an interest, then the focus of the
constitutional inquiry becomes whether big data blacklisting has
occurred. With this as the leading question, the issue of whether big data
blacklisting results in a deprivation of an already cognizable fundamental
liberty interest would become a secondary concern. This is because any
secondary deprivation—such as a restriction on the right to travel—
would be ancillary to the primary deprivation. In other words, big data
blacklisting would be, in and of itself, the primary deprivation of liberty.
Under this theory, courts would construe big data blacklisting harms as
an infringement upon a fundamental liberty interest through the
obstruction, interference, and technological mediation of freedoms,
rights, and privileges generally.15
This Article first discusses big data blacklisting as a constitutionally
cognizable harm. Part I of this Article explores, in an introductory
manner, the appropriateness of both procedural and substantive due
process as possible legal frameworks for vindicating big data blacklisting
harms. It argues that big data blacklisting systems create an
administrative and noncriminal “guilty until proven innocent” concern
for the digitally blacklisted. The process of big data blacklisting and the
digital suspicion it creates are an infringement upon a fundamental liberty
interest.
14. For the purposes of this Article, certain programs, such as the Terrorist Watchlist and
No Fly List are referred to as classified or semi-classified. While these programs themselves are
not technically classified, the government has explained that these programs are informed by
classified information. “The term ‘classified information’ means information which . . . is, for
reasons of national security, specifically designated by a United States Government Agency for
limited or restricted dissemination or distribution.” 18 U.S.C. 798(b) (2012).
15. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 1, at 1209 (“[C]ourts have considered many . . . claims”
concerning “the freedom to perform desired actions . . . .”).
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Additionally, this Article seeks to establish a preliminary factual
record of a representative sample of big data blacklisting programs, their
functionality, and observed harms and deprivations resulting from their
use. Part II provides an overview of the mechanics and structure of
nonclassified programs such as the No Work List (i.e., database screening
through E-Verify to conduct work eligibility assessments),16 the No Vote
List (i.e., database screening to conduct voter purges from voter
registration rolls through Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements
(SAVE),17 Help America Vote Act (HAVA),18 etc.), and the No
16. E-Verify is a “pilot” program jointly operated by the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Social Security Administration (SSA) that enables employers to screen
employees’ personally identifiable data (e.g., name, birthdate, and Social Security Number)
through government databases over the Internet to “verify” the identity and employment
eligibility of the employee. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., E-VERIFY USER MANUAL FOR EMPLOYERS 1 (2014), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites
/default/files/files/nativedocuments/E-Verify_Manual.pdf. E-Verify is referred to as the “Basic
Pilot Program” in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA) and in subsequent congressional action extending its funding. Id. at 77–78; Basic Pilot
Extension Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-128, 115 Stat. 2407, 2407 (2002) (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101, 1324a (2012)); Basic Pilot Program Extension and Expansion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.
108-156, 117 Stat. 1944, 1944 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1324a (2012)). For a thorough
discussion of E-Verify and its legal implications, see Juliet Stumpf, Getting to Work: Why Nobody
Cares About E-Verify (And Why They Should), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 381 (2012). See also
Margaret Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 564 (2012) (discussing the
delegation of employment verification and immigration screening to private entities, such as
employers) (citing Stephen Lee, Private Immigration Screening in the Workplace, 61 STAN L.
REV. 1103, 1130 (2009); Huyen Pham, The Private Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 96 GEO.
L.J. 777, 780–81 (2008)).
17. In recent years, state election officials have used the SAVE database screening protocol
to conduct voter purges. See infra Subsection II.A.2; see also Fatma Marouf, The Hunt for
Noncitizen Voters, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 66 (2012). For more information on the SAVE
database screening program, see U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/USCIS/PIA-006, PRIVACY
IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE SYSTEMATIC ALIEN VERIFICATION FOR ENTITLEMENTS (SAVE)
PROGRAM 12 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_uscis_
save.pdf.
18. See, e.g., Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat.
1666, 1666–1730 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2012)). HAVA
requires each state to implement and maintain an electronic database of all registered voters. 42
U.S.C. § 15483(a). HAVA also requires states to verify the identity of the voter registration
application through cross-checking the applicant’s driver’s license or last four digits of the
applicant’s Social Security Number. Id. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i). If the individual does not have either
number, the state must assign a voter identification number to the applicant. Id.
§ 15483(a)(5)(A)(ii). Each state election office oversees election rules and procedures for that
state in the implementation of HAVA. President Signs H.R. 3295, “Help America Vote Act of
2002,” SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (Nov. 7, 2002), http://www.ssa.gov/legislation/legis_bulletin_
110702.html [hereinafter President Signs HAVA]. Excellent research has been conducted in recent
years on these emerging developments in election law. See, e.g., Rebecca Green, Rethinking
Transparency in U.S. Elections, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 779 (2014); Martha Kropf, North Carolina
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Citizenship List (i.e., database screening to support immigration
detention and deportation under the Prioritized Enforcement Program
(PEP),19 the former Secure Communities (S-COMM) program,20 etc.).
The big data blacklisting harms of digital screening tools to make
eligibility decisions are not, however, limited to these nonclassified
programs. This Article suggests that the same issues may be at play with
classified and semi-classified big data programs. Next, this Article
addresses such programs, specifically the No Fly List (i.e., database
screening through Secure Flight and other databases for digital watchlist

Election Reform Ten Years After the Help America Vote Act, 12 ELECTION L.J. 179 (2013); Daniel
P. Tokaji, HAVA in Court: A Summary and Analysis of Litigation, 12 ELECTION L.J. 203 (2013);
Daniel P. Tokaji & Paul Gronke, The Party Line: Assessing the Help America Vote Act, 12
ELECTION L.J. 111 (2013).
19. DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson announced DHS Prioritized Enforcement Program (PEP)
on November 20, 2014, to replace the S-COMM program; however, it appears that the database
screening protocols of S-COMM will remain intact under PEP. See Memorandum from Jeh
Charles Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir.,
Immigration & Customs Enforcement, 2 (Nov. 20, 2014), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/
default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_secure_communities.pdf.
20. S-COMM, now renamed PEP, see id., is an interoperability program that facilitates data
sharing and database screening protocols between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
DHS, and local law enforcement agencies. See Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION &
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
Important scholarship has addressed multiple legal issues relating to S-COMM in recent years.
See, e.g., HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 79–83 (2014) (discussing the
negative consequences of state and local information gathering in the face of S-COMM); Thomas
J. Miles & Adam B. Cox, Does Immigration Enforcement Reduce Crime? Evidence from Secure
Communities, 57 J.L. & ECON. 937 (2014) (arguing that S-COMM had a limited impact on the
reduction of crime); Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Policing Immigration, 80 U. CHI. L. REV.
87, 110–34 (2013) (discussing the impact of S-COMM as including potential interference with
local crime control efforts and facilitating a potential “disparate impact” on specific
communities); Christopher N. Lasch, Rendition Resistance, 92 N.C. L. REV. 149, 209–16 (2013)
(describing the effect of S-COMM as “immigration rendition” and calling into question the
legality of immigration detainers under S-COMM). DHS explains that S-COMM is justified by a
combination of authorities. See Memorandum from Riah Ramlogan, Deputy Principal Legal
Advisor, to Beth N. Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S.
Immigration & Customs Enforcement (Oct. 2, 2010), available at http://uncoverthetruth.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/01/Mandatory-in-2013-Memo.pdf. DHS relied upon the following: (1) that
28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 534(a)(4) together provide the FBI with authority to share
fingerprint data with ICE/DHS; (2) that 8 U.S.C. § 1722 mandates the development of a data
sharing system that “enable(s) intelligence and law enforcement agencies to determine the
inadmissibility or deportability of an [undocumented immigrant]”; and (3) that 42 U.S.C. § 14616
ratifies information or database sharing between federal and state agencies. Id. at 4–6.
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nomination)21 and the Terrorist Watchlist (i.e., database screening
through the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB)).22
Part III focuses on how each program screens the general public and
subpopulations through big data protocols and, in the process, creates its
own class of big data blacklisted individuals. Specifically, it explains
how, for example, matches and mismatches in big data systems can lead
to inferential guilt that can directly or indirectly categorize individuals as
administratively “guilty until proven innocent” by virtue of digitally
generated suspicion. The risk of mass, erroneously heightened suspicion
that is now facilitated by big data tools places fundamental liberty
interests at risk as well.
Part IV contends that substantive due process rights were forged in a
small data world.23 It is now necessary, therefore, to revise the substantive
due process inquiry in light of big data challenges and constitutional
threats. This Article concludes that the lack of procedural and substantive
due process protections in place to safeguard those wrongly facing digital
blacklisting and the mass scale of the problem will likely place
unprecedented pressure on core constitutional rights.

21. For an excellent discussion on the No Fly List, including a careful examination of both
the constitutional and human impact, see KAHN, supra note 1. Jeffrey Kahn carefully lays out the
history and programmatic structure of the No Fly List. Id. at 137–53; see also Vision 100—
Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-176, 117 Stat. 2490, 2568 (2003)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44903 (2012)); Secure Flight Program, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,018,
64,019 (Oct. 28, 2008) (codified at 49 C.F.R. §§ 1540, 1544, 1560); Press Release, Transp. &
Sec. Admin., TSA to Test New Passenger Pre-Screening System (Aug. 26, 2004), available at
http://www.tsa.gov/press/releases/2004/08/26/tsa-test-new-passenger-pre-screening-system
(describing the implementation of a post-9/11 passenger prescreening program that checks
passengers’ names against terrorist watchlists to improve the use of “no fly” lists). The Computer
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS II) relies upon the Passenger Name Record
database (PNR), checks the passenger’s data against the Transportation Security Administration’s
(TSA) “No-Fly” list and the FBI’s lists, and assigns a terrorist “risk score” through statistical
algorithms. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., CAPPS II: Myths and Facts (Feb.
13, 2004), available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=478534.
22. The Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) is “often referred to as the ‘Terrorist
Watchlist.’” About the Terrorist Screening Center, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE, available at https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc/about-the-terrorist-screeningcenter.
23. “‘Small data,’ like ‘big data,’ has no set definition.” Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big
Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 329 n.6 (2015). Generally,
small data can be described as “solving discrete questions with limited and structured data, and
the data are generally controlled by one institution.” Id. (citing JULES J. BERMAN, PRINCIPLES OF
BIG DATA: PREPARING, SHARING, AND ANALYZING COMPLEX INFORMATION 1–2 (2013)).
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE BIG DATA BLACKLISTING INQUIRY
Before individuals are allowed to fly,24 work,25 drive,26 or vote,27
citizens and noncitizens alike may now be subjected to mass data
collection and automated or semi-automated database screening
protocols.28 Increasingly, in the name of national security and homeland
security, post-9/11 big data programs implemented by the government
partially obstruct core rights and freedoms in some instances and
altogether block them in others.29 Moreover, because of the virtual nature
of mass data collection and database screening, and the classified or semi24. See infra Subsections II.B.2 and III.B.2.
25. See infra Subsections II.A.1 and III.A.1.
26. Prior to issuing driver’s licenses, many states now screen individuals through SAVE, a
database screening program operated by DHS. See, e.g., Applying for a Driver’s License or State
Identification Card, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. 2, available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/
sevis/pdf/dmv_factsheet.pdf (last updated Sept. 5, 2012) (“Most states and territories use the
Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) Program to determine a non-citizen’s
eligibility for many public benefits, including the issuance of a driver’s license.”).
27. See infra Subsections II.A.2 and III.A.2
28. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1260 (2007) (“Automated decision systems have been characterized as rules-based programs,
data-matching programs, or data-mining programs. . . . [For example,] data-matching systems
compare two or more databases with an algorithmic set of rules that determine the likelihood that
two sets of personal identifying information represent the same individual.” (citing Daniel J.
Steinbock, Data Matching, Data Mining, and Due Process, 40 GA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2005)); Citron
& Pasquale, The Scored Society, supra note 13, at 4 (“Automated systems are claimed to rate all
individuals in the same way . . . . [However, b]ecause human beings program predictive
algorithms, their biases and values are embedded into the software’s instructions, known as the
source code and predictive algorithms. Scoring systems mine datasets containing inaccurate and
biased information provided by people.”) (footnote omitted); Michael Rich, Machine Learning,
Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(describing “Automated Suspicion Algorithms” as “machine learning processes [that] seek to
predict individual criminality”), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2593795.
29. Journalist and attorney Glenn Greenwald, and journalist and documentary filmmaker
Laura Poitras—who reportedly exercise sole possession over the full Snowden files—and other
surveillance experts have shared the view that the Snowden disclosures profoundly implicate
questions of democratic governance. GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD
SNOWDEN, THE NSA, AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 6 (2014) (“Will the digital age . . . bring
about a system of omnipresent monitoring and control [?]”); Peter Maass, The Intercept’s Laura
Poitras Wins Academy Award for ‘Citizenfour’, INTERCEPT (Feb. 22, 2014), available at https://
firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/22/poitras-wins-oscar-for-citizenfour/ (“‘The disclosures that
Edward Snowden revealed don’t only expose a threat to our privacy but to our democracy itself,’
Poitras said in her acceptance speech [at the 87th Academy Awards, immediately after Poitras
received the Oscar for Best Documentary Feature for directing Citizenfour].”); RACHEL
LEVINSON-WALDMAN, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT THE GOVERNMENT DOES WITH
AMERICANS’ DATA 9 (2013) (“The collection and retention of non-criminal information about
Americans for law enforcement and national security purposes poses profound challenges to our
democracy and our liberties.”).
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classified nature of certain programs, the digital mediation of and
potential interference with liberty interests can occur without the
individual’s knowledge or consent.30
Many emerging big data cybersurveillance31 and dataveillance32
systems have not been fully interrogated. Yet, these big data systems are
rapidly proliferating as a post-9/11 policy prescription to assess and
prevent potential criminal and terroristic threats.33 The implications of
government-led big data screening programs are especially critical in
how they impact those subjected to specific administrative and
investigatory actions as a result of the digital screening protocol and data
analysis. But these implications are not meaningful in the abstract. To
demonstrate this phenomenon and the associated harms, this Article
describes the mechanics and consequences of multiple big data
cybersurveillance and mass dataveillance programs that purportedly
serve homeland security and national security objectives. First, however,
30. See, e.g., PRIVACY AND POWER: A TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE IN THE SHADOW OF THE
NSA-AFFAIR (Russell A. Miller ed., forthcoming); Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big
Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773 (2015); Anjali S. Dalal, Shadow Administrative
Constitutionalism and the Creation of Surveillance Culture, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 61 (2014);
Anil Kalhan, Immigration Surveillance, 74 MD. L. REV. 1 (2014); Patrick Toomey & Brett Max
Kaufman, The Notice Paradox: Secret Surveillance, Criminal Defendants, & the Right to Notice,
54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 843 (2014); Paul Ohm, Electronic Surveillance Law and the IntraAgency Separation of Powers, 47 U.S.F. L. REV. 269 (2012); Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s
Little Helpers: How Choice Point and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your
Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMM. REG. 595 (2004).
31. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 209 (2006) (describing
cybersurveillance or “digital surveillance” as “the process by which some form of human activity
is analyzed by a computer according to some specified rule. . . . [T]he critical feature in each [case
of surveillance] is that a computer is sorting data for some follow-up review by some human”).
Critically important works published in recent years have helped to illuminate the modern
surveillance architecture. See, e.g., JULIA ANGWIN, DRAGNET NATION: A QUEST FOR PRIVACY,
SECURITY, AND FREEDOM IN A WORLD OF RELENTLESS SURVEILLANCE 17–18 (2014); SHANE
HARRIS, @WAR: THE RISE OF THE MILITARY-INTERNET COMPLEX (2014); DANA PRIEST &
WILLIAM M. ARKIN, TOP SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE
(2011); SHANE HARRIS, THE WATCHERS (2010); ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., NO PLACE TO HIDE
(2006); JENNIFER STISA GRANICK, BYE, BYE, AMERICAN SPIES: WHAT MODERN SURVEILLANCE IS,
WHY YOU SHOULD CARE, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (forthcoming).
32. See, e.g., Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, 31 COMM.
ASS’N FOR COMPUTING MACHINERY 498 (1988). Roger Clarke describes dataveillance as “the
systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or monitoring of the actions or
communications of one or more persons.” Id. at 499. See also DAVID LYON, SURVEILLANCE
STUDIES 16 (2007) (“Being much cheaper than direct physical or electronic surveillance
[dataveillance] enables the watching of more people or populations, because economic constraints
to surveillance are reduced. Dataveillance also automates surveillance. Classically, government
bureaucracies have been most interested in gathering such data . . . .”).
33. See, e.g., Jennifer C. Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted,
Noncustodial Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 328–30 (2014).
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Part I attempts to provide background information to help contextualize
the big data blacklisting phenomenon.
A. What Is Big Data Blacklisting?
Big data blacklisting is the process of categorizing individuals as
administratively “guilty until proven innocent” by virtue of suspicious
digital data and database screening results.34 Constitutional liberty
interests assumed in a small data world are now threatened in ways that
are difficult to grasp. In a small data world, governmental entities were
often prevented from digitally mediating rights and liberties due to
technological and resource limitations.35 Thus, freedoms generally could
be obstructed only individually or in groups. If they were obstructed en
mass, freedoms were often obstructed directly and physically (e.g., mass
incarceration and mass internment). In other words, inherent governance
and technological limitations generally rendered impracticable mass
deprivations, including erroneous mass deprivations, on a scale of
millions of individuals based upon digitally generated suspicion or
heightened suspicion facilitated by big data tools. This was particularly
so within a democratic system designed to enforce strong procedural
protections in criminal justice matters.36

34. It is important to recognize that legal scholars have used the term “blacklist” in a variety
of academic contexts. See, e.g., Dawn C. Nunziato, The Beginning of the End of Internet Freedom,
45 GEO. J. INT’L L. 383 (2014) (describing the practice of “blacklisting” websites and filtering
internet content by governments in the international community and in the United States, and the
threat to free speech protections this poses); Katharine A. Van Tassel, Blacklisted: The
Constitutionality of the Federal System for Publishing Reports of “Bad” Doctors in the National
Practitioner Data Bank, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 2031 (2012) (discussing the risks of infringement
of rights of doctors through the use of the National Practitioner Data Bank, a “blacklisting”
database for medical professionals); Catherine L. Fisk, The Role of Private Intellectual Property
Rights in Markets for Labor and Ideas: Screen Credit and the Writers Guild of America, 19382000, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 215 (2011) (describing the use of “blacklists” in the industry
to distance itself from screenwriters with questionable political views).
35. See, e.g., Kevin S. Bankston & Ashkan Soltani, Tiny Constables and the Cost of
Surveillance: Making Cents Out of United States v. Jones, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 335 (2014).
36. Cole, supra note 1, at 506 (“In theory, the paradigm of prevention is constrained by a
number of constitutional principles under U.S. law, including substantive and procedural due
process, freedoms of speech and association, equal protection, and the civil-criminal divide. In
practice, however, formal constitutional constraints have played a relatively modest role in
restricting preventive measures.”); Joshua A.T. Fairfield & Erik Luna, Digital Innocence, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 981, 1009 (2014) (“Given that Big Data is the aggregation of data about data,
and that all data online is handed off to ISPs in some form or another, the foregoing principles
have been (over) extended to place the entire Internet outside of meaningful constitutional
protections, thereby allowing massive, suspicionless, and even prospective data gathering by
government.”).
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Yet, in what Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson have termed the
“National Surveillance State,”37 the procedural protections that once
operated in traditional administrative and criminal justice matters are at
risk.38 In the National Surveillance State that is rapidly unfolding within
the Information Age, it is not so much physical personhood that big data
programs threaten but, as Daniel Solove asserts, it is digital personhood
and the “digital person” that are at risk.39 The research of big data
scholars40 and others illuminates the disruptive and transformative nature
of big data.
For example, several scholars assert that big data-driven policing
methods that are predictive in nature make irrelevant in practice the legal
37. See Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 12 (2008); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change:
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 520–
21 (2006) (defining the “National Surveillance State” as being “characterized by a significant
increase in government investments in technology and government bureaucracies devoted to
promoting domestic security and (as its name implies) gathering intelligence and surveillance
using all of the devices that the digital revolution allows”).
38. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 37, at 523. Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson explain
that, in the National Surveillance State,
[T]he government can create a parallel law enforcement structure that routes
around the traditional criminal justice system with its own rules for surveillance,
apprehension, interrogation, detention, and punishment. Because it is not subject
to the oversight and restrictions of the criminal justice system, the government
may be increasingly tempted to use this parallel system for more and more things.
It [the government] may argue that the criminal justice system is outmoded and
insufficiently flexible to deal with the types of security problems it now faces.
However, the more that the government routes around the criminal justice
system, the more it institutionalizes the parallel system as the method of choice.
Id.
39. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 1 (2004) (“It is ever more possible to create an electronic collage that covers
much of a person’s life—a life captured in records, a digital person composed in the collective
computer networks of the world.”); see also id. at 161 (“Privacy is about degrees of accessibility.
The threat to privacy is not in isolated pieces of information, but in increased access and
aggregation, the construction of digital dossiers and the uses to which they are put.”).
40. See, e.g., danah boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations
for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 662–
79 (2012); ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA
INFRASTRUCTURES & THEIR CONSEQUENCES xv–xvii (2014); EVGENY MOROZOV, TO SAVE
EVERYTHING, CLICK HERE: THE FOLLY OF TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONISM ix–xv (2013); MAYERSCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2; Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Privacy in the Age of Big
Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 63, 63–64 (2012); Solon Barocas &
Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 3–6), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2477899;
Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, supra note 30, at 775–91.
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requirement of reasonable suspicion.41 Similarly, scholars such as Joshua
Fairfield and Erik Luna ask whether the small data “innocence” of
criminal defendants now must be recast as big data “digital innocence.”42
Jack Balkin43 and other experts contend that big data and technologies of
surveillance made possible by the Information Society have changed the
landscape of governance tools.44 To assist in grappling with this sea
change, Erin Murphy explains that modern technological advances have
introduced new governmental “paradigms of restraint”—techniques of
punishment and restraint that focus on governance through emerging
surveillance developments that do not depend upon physical restraint and

41. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 23, at 331–32 (“[R]easonable suspicion—as a small data
doctrine—may become practically irrelevant in an era of big data policing . . . . [because it]
becomes significantly distorted when officers have access to more individualized or predictive
information about a suspect.”); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing by the Numbers: Big Data and the
Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35, 56 (2014) (questioning, for example, “whether
predictive software based on historical crime data is similar to other uses of third party information
that have already been held to support a reasonable suspicion determination”); Rich, supra note
28, at 5 (explaining that, until the introduction of machine learning technologies, “determining
the existence of individualized suspicion—determining whether the historical facts give rise to
probable cause or reasonable suspicion—has remained the sole province of human actors”)
(footnote omitted).
42. Fairfield & Luna, supra note 36, at 988–91 (2014) (“The growth of data collection,
connection, and parsing capabilities could transform Big Data technologies into an important tool
for establishing innocence . . . . [However,] data science and Big Data technologies have been
overwhelmingly used to convict.”) (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD, 179–80 (2009)).
Brandon Garrett argues that, in the criminal procedure context, “[a]s big data “becomes
increasingly relevant to criminal cases . . . rules capable of handling complex and Big Data
discovery should be developed.” Brandon L. Garrett, Big Data and Due Process, 99 CORNELL L.
REV. ONLINE 207, 208 (2014).
43. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 37, at 12; Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech
Regulation, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2297 (2014) (“The digital era is different. Governments can
target for control or surveillance many different aspects of the digital infrastructure that people
use to communicate: telecommunications and broadband companies, web hosting services,
domain name registrars, search engines, social media platforms, payment systems, and
advertisers.”).
44. See, e.g., LYON, supra note 32, at 16; David Lyon, Surveillance, Snowden, and Big
Data: Capacities, Consequences, Critique, BIG DATA & SOC. 2 (2014) (“[A]s political-economic
and socio-technological circumstances change, so surveillance also undergoes alteration,
sometimes transformation.”); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1934, 1949 (2013) (discussing “the risks surveillance poses to democratic selfgovernance . . . [including] self-censorship, in terms of speech, action, or even belief”) (internal
citation omitted); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN
AN ANXIOUS AGE 175–84 (2005); Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: Facebook, Google, and the Future
of Privacy and Free Speech, in CONSTITUTION 3.0: FREEDOM AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 69–
82 (Jeffrey Rosen & Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011).

1750

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

fall outside of the criminal law context.45 David Cole,46 Jennifer Daskal,47
Ian Kerr,48 and other scholars assert that these new developments in
governance methods are preventative and ex ante in nature, and precrimefocused.49 Cole contends that surveillance is but one tool among many
governance tools that now comprises a new “paradigm of prevention”
that has been embraced in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 9/11.50
Gabriella Blum and Ben Wittes,51 and others have described the manner
in which technological developments, including surveillance
technologies, are now deployed in a way that forces a reconceptualization
of the “social contract.”52
45. Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1329 (2008) (“A range of
new technologies has greatly enhanced the state’s ability to monitor large numbers of individuals.
With the advent of surveillance methods less costly than physical restraint, the standard binary of
incarceration and liberty has unfurled into a broad continuum on which those two choices mark
only the extremes.”).
46. Cole, supra note 1, at 503 (characterizing “the post-9/11 full-scale adoption of a
paradigm of prevention” as “a sea change”).
47. Daskal, supra note 33, at 331 (explaining that precrime “restrictions share common
features: they are targeted at particular individuals, entities, or categories of individuals; they
impose noncustodial restrictions; and they are preventive in both purpose and effect”).
48. Ian Kerr, Prediction, Pre-emption, Presumption: The Path of Law After the
Computational Turn, in PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN: THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW MEETS THE PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 91–120 (Mireille Hildebrandt &
Katja de Vries eds., 2013) (contending that predictive technologies facilitate a philosophy of preemption that shifts ex post facto systems of punishment to ex ante systems of prevention in a way
that threatens due process); see also Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption,
Presumption: How Big Data Threatens Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 66
(2013).
49. See, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 23, at 351; Joh, supra note 41, at 56; see also Mark L.
Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29 GEO. IMMIGRATION L.
J. 45 (2015) (discussing the “deployment nationwide [of] a new automated risk assessment tool
to help determine whether to detain or release noncitizens pending their deportation
proceedings”).
50. Cole, supra note 1, at 501 (explaining that the “paradigm of prevention” includes many
tools, including “the use of pretextual charges for preventive detention, the expansion of criminal
liability to prohibit conduct that precedes terrorism, and expansion of surveillance at home and
abroad”).
51. BENJAMIN WITTES & GABRIELLA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE: ROBOTS AND
GERMS, HACKERS AND DRONES—CONFRONTING A NEW AGE OF THREAT 13–14 (2015).
52. Id. at 13 (discussing the “conceptual challenges that this new security environment
poses—how it disrupts the traditional social contract described by the Enlightenment political
theorists, how it forces us to rethink notions of privacy and the relationship between liberty and
security within the liberal state, and how it defies the traditional allocation of powers among states
over their territories and citizens”); SIMON CHESTERMAN, ONE NATION UNDER SURVEILLANCE: A
NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT TO DEFEND FREEDOM WITHOUT SACRIFICING LIBERTY 251–52 (2011)
(explaining that surveillance technologies are forcing an evolution of the social contract that
“differs from the traditional social contract[,]” and observing that “[p]rivacy theorists and lawyers
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Those concerned with surveillance and privacy in the digital age often
rely upon the protective potential of the Fourth Amendment of the
Constitution. Scholars such as Danielle Citron and David Gray,53 Laura
Donohue,54 Orin Kerr,55 Christopher Slobogin,56 and others57 have
explored the capacity of the Fourth Amendment to address challenges of
modern surveillance. Yet, the Fourth Amendment does not generally
cover big data systems designed to execute day-to-day bureaucratized
surveillance. In light of this, Danielle Citron explains that emerging
technologies require an evolution of procedural due process.58 This
evolution must include, for example, greater transparency in describing
the underlying algorithms or automated systems that may impact rights
and privileges.59 Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz explain that the
predictive harms of big data systems in the private sector require a
conceptualization of Citron’s technological due process rights when such
harms occur.60

have struggled to respond to these moves, in part because of the diminishing sphere of truly private
activity and the growing coercive powers of the state”).
53. See, e.g., David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 62, 63–64 (2013); David C. Gray & Danielle Keats Citron, A Shattered Looking Glass:
The Pitfalls and Potential of the Mosaic Theory of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 14 N.C. J.L. &
TECH. 381, 390 (2013).
54. See, e.g., Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of International Telephone
and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 202–19 (2015); Laura K. Donohue, Bulk
Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Considerations, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
757, 863–64 (2014); Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 514–29 (2012).
55. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L.
REV. 311, 313 (2012); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 802–08 (2004).
56. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Panvasive Surveillance, Political Process Theory, and
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 102 GEO. L.J. 1721, 1733–42 (2014); Christopher Slobogin, Making
the Most of United States v. Jones in a Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic
Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 1, 3–4 (2012).
57. See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, Databuse: Digital Privacy and the Mosaic, BROOKINGS
INST. (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2011/04/01-databuse-wittes.
58. Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 28, at 1281 (2007) (noting that with the
advent of automated decisionmaking technologies and “in the automated administrative state,
neither due process nor policymaking procedures adequately protect individuals”).
59. See id. at 1284 (“Access to an automated program’s source code—the programmer’s
instructions to the computer—might provide a meaningful way for individuals to challenge an
agency’s claims and dispel the influence of automation bias.”) (citing Christopher W. Clifton,
Deirdre K. Mulligan & Raghu Ramakrishnan, Data Mining and Privacy: An Overview, in
PRIVACY AND TECHNOLOGIES OF IDENTITY: A CROSS-DISCIPLINARY CONVERSATION 191, 203
(Katherine Strandburg & Daniela Stan Raicu eds., 2006)).
60. See, e.g., Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 122 (2014) (“Citron’s
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B. Big Data Blacklisting and Due Process Liberty Interests
This Article attempts to extend the discussion on the intersection of
due process and big data further by proposing another framework: the
remediation of governmental big data blacklisting harms through a
substantive due process approach. Big data blacklisting does not yet
appear to be a constitutionally cognizable claim or harm under the
existing jurisprudence. Yet, big data blacklisting itself is the harm that
may be considered unconstitutional when grounded in due process
through a conceptualization of what substantive due process rights can
and should encompass, in an age when daily existence and governing
methods both have been utterly transformed by big data technologies.
It is arguable, in fact, that the United States is on the verge recognizing
of such a right. In support of this argument, it is significant to note that
several litigants61 and scholars have recently attempted to define and
vindicate this right: to be free of the offense of inclusion on a digital
watchlist and to be free of an obstruction of liberty interests that may
occur through database screening and other dataveillance or
cybersurveillance.62
[technological due process] approach could be expanded to address the predictive privacy harms
of Big Data.”).
61. In multiple recent cases filed in federal court, plaintiffs have alleged constitutionally
protected rights are potentially infringed upon by digital watchlisting and, therefore, seek recourse
through the removal of their names and records from watchlists and databases. See, e.g., Plaintiff’s
Petition for Judicial Review at 3, Naim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 1:15-cv-00842 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
28, 2015) (“Petitioner respectfully requests confirmation that his name is removed and/or cleared
from any of the federal ‘watchlists’ that may operate to prejudice and/or impede his
constitutionally protected liberty interests and his constitutional right to travel.”); Plaintiff’s
Complaint at 2, Abdelfattah v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 1:07-cv-01842-RCL, ¶ 6 (D.D.C. Oct.
11, 2007) (“This suit seeks an order from this [honorable] court, to order the US government and
its defendants [sic] agencies (ICE, CBP, CIS, FBI) to Expunge Plaintiff TECS/IBIS record located
in the Treasury Enforcement Communication System know [sic] as (TECS II).”).
62. Aaron Caplan, Jennifer Daskal, Jeffrey Kahn, Peter Margulies, Peter Shane, Daniel
Steinbock, Juliet Stumpf, Daniel Solove, and others, have proposed more robust constitutional
protections and other legal remedies are needed in light of emerging policies and technological
developments. Although these scholars do not frame the potential constitutional harms and
privacy harms as big data blacklisting harms, they are also concerned with the liberty
infringements and restrictions on freedom that are associated with digital watchlisting, database
screening, and other bureaucratized surveillance programs. See, e.g., Caplan, supra note 1, at
1203–05 (proposing that “the constitutional immunity from bills of attainder[–]that is, the rule
against singling out persons for punishment without trial[–]should be recognized as a due process
liberty interest,” and specifically discussing “government blacklists” like the “No Fly List”);
Daskal, supra note 33, at 362 (describing the impact of the No Fly List as having “a significant
and underappreciated impact on substantive liberty interests”); Jeffrey Kahn, International Travel
and the Constitution, 56 UCLA L. REV. 271, 276 (2008) (arguing that a fundamental liberty
interest in the right for U.S. citizens to travel internationally should be recognized); Shane, supra
note 10, at 810 (arguing for a “tailoring [of] the formality of post inclusion adjudication (1) to the
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The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no person
shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law.”63 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment further
states that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.”64 The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments encompass both a procedural and a substantive
component. Erwin Chemerinsky explains the distinction between
procedural and substantive due process in the following way:
[S]trangely enough, if you look through Supreme Court
opinions you will never find a definition [of substantive due
process]. Substantive due process asks the question of
whether the government’s deprivation of a person’s life,
liberty or property is justified by a sufficient purpose.
Procedural due process, by contrast, asks whether the
government has followed the proper procedures when it
takes away life, liberty or property. Substantive due process
looks to whether there is a sufficient substantive
justification, a good enough reason for such a deprivation.65
Procedural due process is the concept that when the government
deprives a citizen of an interest in life, liberty, or property, it must give
nature of the different claims that may arise and (2) to the level of care exercised to protect the
rights of individuals during determinations to list particular individuals at the “front end” of the
process”); Steinbock, supra note 1, at 68–69 (arguing that potential reforms of the practice of
watchlisting could include “narrowing the substantive standard for selection; adding procedural
protection, particularly some form of adversarial process; and restricting the uses of watch list
results”); Stumpf, Getting to Work, supra note 16, at 406–07 (arguing for consideration of a
potential constitutional liberty interest in preventing obstruction of employment opportunities that
may occur through E-Verify database screening, elaborating that: “[T]he liberty interest here is
the right not to be deprived of employment through arbitrary government action. Another way of
articulating this is to say that deprivation of the freedom to engage in the lawful behavior of
working requires due process of law if it is to avoid arbitrariness”); Peter Margulies, Rage Against
the Machine?: Automated Surveillance and Human Rights 33 (forthcoming 2016) (arguing that
“compliance with safeguards would permit tailored reconnaissance and surveillance, while
protecting rights”) (citation omitted), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2657619; Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret Jurisdiction, EMORY L. J.
(forthcoming 2016) available at http://http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=26477
79; see also DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 98 (2008) (“By understanding privacy
as shaped by the norms of society, we can better see why privacy should not be understood solely
as an individual right. . . . [P]rivacy protects the individual because of the benefits it confers on
society.”); SOLOVE, DIGITAL PERSON, supra note 39, at 160–61 (“Public records are increasingly
posing a serious threat to privacy in the Information Age. . . . The threat to privacy is not in isolated
pieces of information, but in increased access and aggregation, the construction of digital dossiers
and the uses to which they are put.”).
63. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
65. Erwin Chemerinsky, Substantive Due Process, 15 TOURO L. REV. 1501, 1501 (1999).
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the citizen notice and an opportunity to be heard.66 Substantive due
process, on the other hand, is not as simple. One expert explains that
“Supreme Court decisions often give the impression that substantive due
process jurisprudence fits into a simple two-tiered framework. Within this
model, government intrusions on so-called ‘fundamental’ rights are
subject to ‘strict’ or exacting scrutiny, a test sometimes formulated as
inquiring whether a burden is necessary to promote a ‘compelling state
interest.’”67 Substantive due process rights often appear as a protection of
rights that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”68
Rights that are not “fundamental” or “deeply rooted” are subject to lesser
scrutiny. “All other liberty interests may be abridged or abrogated
pursuant to a validly enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”69
The fundamental liberty interests of the preexisting substantive due
process doctrine often turn on autonomy, dignity, self-determination, and
individual identity.70 This substantive due process jurisprudence,
therefore, is consistent with predominant themes in the contemporary
privacy discourse. Increasingly, scholars are examining the concept of
the “proliferation of networked identities and selves,” which concerns the
preservation of the autonomous self within the infrastructure of the
Information Society.71 In addition, scholars such as Anita Allen,72 Ryan

66. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976).
67. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 314 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
68. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997).
69. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003).
70. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–98 (2015) (“In addition these
liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including
intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”) (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965); see also Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 574 (2003); Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 726 (1997); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a
person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
71. Frank Pasquale & Danielle Keats Citron, Promoting Innovation While Preventing
Discrimination: Policy Goals for the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1413, 1413–14 (2014)
(referring to the work of Professor Tal Z. Zarsky); see, e.g., JULIE COHEN, CONFIGURING THE
NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 20 (2012); Tal Z. Zarsky,
Understanding Discrimination in the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1380–81 (2014);
Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1913 (2013); Tal Z. Zarsky, Mining
the Networked Self, 6 JERUSALEM REV. LEGAL STUD. 120, 120–21 (2012).
72. See, e.g., Anita L. Allen, Dredging Up the Past: Lifelogging, Memory, and Surveillance,
75 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 66 (2008).
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Calo,73 Danielle Citron and Frank Pasquale,74 Julie Cohen,75 Michael
Froomkin,76 Jon Mills,77 Helen Nissenbaum,78 Neil Richards,79 Paul
Schwartz,80 Daniel Solove,81 and others82 have examined the intersection
of privacy rights with personal and social autonomy rights. The topics of
privacy, surveillance, and an evolving due process jurisprudence are each
extraordinarily complex. An exhaustive, careful treatment of each goes
beyond the scope of this Article. Nonetheless, in support of a substantive
due process approach to big data blacklisting harms, it is worth quickly
noting that the apparent aims of the modern substantive due process
doctrine, and contemporary privacy and surveillance scholarship, may in
many ways each complement the other.83 Scholars such as Mireille
73. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027 (2012); M. Ryan Calo, Essay, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86
IND. L.J. 1131, 1133–35 (2011); M. Ryan Calo, People Can Be So Fake: A New Dimension to
Privacy and Technology Scholarship, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 809, 811–16 (2010).
74. See, e.g., PASQUALE, supra note 13, at 16; Citron & Pasquale, The Scored Society, supra
note 13, at 1419.
75. COHEN, supra note 71, at 20; Cohen, supra note 71, at 1920–21 (2013).
76. See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461, 1465
(2000).
77. See, e.g., JON L. MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 15 (2008) (“We give up the right to
make many decisions as part of the social contract. Being a citizen grants certain rights to
individuals as citizens but also entails giving up certain rights to the government.”).
78. See, e.g., HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE
INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 81–84 (2010); Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as a Contextual Integrity,
79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 125–27 (2004); Helen Nissenbaum, Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or
Oxymoron?, 81 B.U. L. REV. 635, 635–37 (2001).
79. See, e.g., Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, supra note 44, at 1949.
80. See, e.g., Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV.
1609 (1999).
81. See, e.g., SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY, supra note 62, at 89–100.
82. See, e.g., ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 25–26 (1967); Woodrow Hartzog &
Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2013); Jerry
Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1212–20 (1998);
Alan F. Westin, Social and Political Dimensions of Privacy, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 1, 3 (2003) (“Every
society sets a distinctive balance between the private sphere and the public order, based on the
society’s political philosophy.”); David Pozen, Privacy-Privacy Tradeoffs, U. CHI. L. REV.
(forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2624281.
83. Increasingly, privacy scholars are framing privacy rights as public goods or collective
goods. See, e.g., PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN, supra note 48, at 17 (in
a section titled “Privacy and due process: a search for the public goods that inform the legal
rights,” Katja de Vries explains that “[t]he right to due process . . . and the right to privacy . . . are
not simply moral imperatives or philosophical concepts but fully fledged legal rights that can be
derived from a variety of [constitutional] provisions”) (citations omitted); PRISCILLA M. REGAN,
LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 221 (1995) (arguing
that “privacy serves not just individual interests but common, public, and collective purposes”);
Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Privacy as a Public Good, DUKE L.J. (forthcoming). Under this theory, the
protection of privacy could be conceived as similar to the protection of water and the environment.
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Hildebrandt and Katja de Vries encourage an exploration of privacy and
due process not “from the perspective of detailed research into positive
law, but rather understand them as public goods that inform the legal,
moral and political framework of constitutional democracy.”84
Because the effect of the invisible big data revolution of governance
is systemic, the benefit of a method of collective analysis is needed.
Procedural due process alone will not recognize or vindicate a right to be
free from the type of mass interference or obstruction of access to rights
and freedoms that is possible through the government’s application of big
data technologies. Such a right depends on a definition by which big data
blacklisting systems, and the nature and degree of the harm that may
result from such systems, can be sorted and assessed. A lack of
transparency and a lack of known consequences of these systems
complicate defining and characterizing big data blacklisting programs.
These systems, many in their infancy, are often classified, semiclassified, or highly bureaucratized and technologically complex. To best
recognize big data blacklisting harms, however, it is important to note
that big data blacklisting programs may be suspect where they implicate
the following:
(1) Emerging Big Data Governance Tools and Methods:
Establishment of governmental programs and systems that support big
data administrative decision-making processes85 dependent upon
“unthinkably large” volumes of data86 and enormous databases87 at the
disposal of the government to index, catalogue, and analyze individuals
for identity and risk-based assessments;88
Michael Froomkin provocatively suggests that what he terms “privacy pollution” can be
analogized to environmental pollution. A. Michael Froomkin, Regulating Mass Surveillance as
Privacy Pollution: Learning from Environmental Impact Statements, ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 1–4), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2400736.
84. PRIVACY, DUE PROCESS AND THE COMPUTATIONAL TURN, supra note 48, at 2.
85. See, e.g., Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 28, at 1252 (“The twenty-first
century’s automated decision-making systems bring radical change to the administrative state that
last century’s procedural structures cannot manage. In the past, computer systems helped humans
apply rules to individual cases. Now, automated systems have become the primary decision
makers . . . [and] often take human decision making out of the process[.]”) (citations omitted).
86. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 157 (“When the collection expands
to information like financial transactions, health records, and Facebook status updates, the
quantity being gleaned is unthinkably large.”).
87. Id.; see also GARFINKEL, supra note 9, at 54; KUHN, supra note 9, at 2–3; Paul Ohm,
Don’t Build a Database of Ruin, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 23, 2012), https://hbr.org/2012/08/dontbuild-a-database-of-ruin.
88. See Balkin, supra note 37, at 12 (“Much public and private surveillance occurs without
any knowledge that one is watched. More to the point, data mining technologies allow the state
and business enterprises to record perfectly innocent behavior that no one is particularly ashamed
of and draw surprisingly powerful inferences about people’s behavior, beliefs, and attitudes.”).
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(2) Unprecedented Asymmetric Power: Unprecedented governmental
access to public and private data89 leads to an unprecedented asymmetric
power between the state and citizen,90 facilitated through big data systems
and philosophies of governance.91 These power asymmetries are
particularly acute when national security imperatives heighten
governmental power92 while the administrative state objectives may
weaken the position of the citizen in relationship to the government,93
thus necessarily leading to a renegotiation of the “social contract”;94
(3) Targeting Suspicious Data, Not People: Big data technologies
facilitate the government’s ability to search for suspicious data.
Therefore, newly emerging big data programs allow for the tracking and
isolation of digitally generated data deemed suspicious, including
associational data,95 correlative data, data patterns, and record location
and algorithmically matched data, for instance. The government may use
suspicious data and suspicious database screening results to justify a
range of consequences suffered by the person attached to the suspicious
89. See Balkin & Levinson, supra note 37, at 523 (explaining that “information [is] ever
more valuable to governments; this causes governments to invest even more heavily in the
collection, storage, and collation of data”).
90. See id.
91. See Balkin, supra note 37, at 10–11 (“Governance in the National Surveillance State is
increasingly statistically oriented, ex ante and preventative, rather than focused on deterrence and
ex post prosecution of individual wrongdoing.”).
92. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 37, at 523 (“Increased use of information in governance
makes governments and those who control information flows more powerful . . . .”); see also
Shirin Sinnar, Institutionalizing Rights in the National Security Executive, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 289, 346–47 (2015) (“Given the dominance of the security frame, even an interest in rights
promotion may lead institutions to explain, justify, and promote rights by appealing to security.”);
Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover Federalism in the Wake of the
War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1284–85 (2004) (“But our modern preoccupation with
rights provisions may have encouraged us to overlook the possibility that structure remains a
necessary condition for liberty. Especially in times of terror, rights provisions may become
‘parchment barriers’ to governmental oppression. Sometimes it takes a government to check a
government.”) (citations omitted).
93. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 37, at 524–25.
94. See, e.g., CHESTERMAN, supra note 52, at 248–52 (2011) (explaining that surveillance
technologies are forcing an evolution of the social contract that “differs from the traditional social
contract,” and observing that “[p]rivacy theorists and lawyers have struggled to respond to these
moves, in part because of the diminishing sphere of truly private activity and the growing coercive
powers of the state”); see also WITTES & BLUM, supra note 51, at 13–14.
95. See Balkin, supra note 37, at 12 (“Data mining allows inferences not only about the
direct subjects of surveillance, but about other people with whom they live, work, and
communicate.”) (citing Siobhan Gorman, NSA’s Domestic Spying Grows as Agency Sweeps up
Data, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2008, at A1; James X. Dempsey & Lara M. Flint, Commercial Data
and National Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1464–68 (2004)); Deven Desai,
Constitutional Limits on Surveillance: Associational Freedom in the Age of Data Hoarding, 90
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579, 619–24 (2014).
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digitally derived data (e.g., suspicious, Social Security Number (SSN) or
metadata from a smartphone).96 Yet, big data-derived knowledge is
unlike small data-derived knowledge in that it is based upon artificial
intelligence, allowing some to compare algorithmic-driven
determinations to virtual reality;97
(4) Diminishing Transaction Costs: As a byproduct of the big data
revolution, the transaction costs for the collection and analysis of data
have rapidly decreased.98 Therefore, economic restraints on investigatory
and administrative capacity to impose consequences are rapidly
decreasing as well, especially with the rise of automated or semiautomated processes that can be conducted in real time and remotely, and
can be delegated to other private and public entities.99 Not only are the
transaction costs of big data governance rapidly diminishing (e.g.,
collection and analysis of digital data for “voter integrity” objectives are
almost costless), correspondingly, the transaction costs of digitally driven
deprivations are rapidly diminishing as well (e.g., big data voter purges
that are database-driven are relatively costless compared with small data
voter purges);
(5) Ex Ante and Preventive or Precrime Objectives: Deployment of
big data programs that may often attempt to achieve ex ante
objectives100—including preventive justice or precrime determinations
from digital watchlisting and database screening programs—can lead to
a range of ex ante harms, including the mediation, interference, and
obstruction of freedoms and privileges; stigmatization and reputational

96. See, e.g., Cate, supra note 37; Richard Sobel, The Demeaning of Identity and
Personhood in National Identification Systems, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 319, 343–48 (2002).
97. See, e.g., Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, supra note 30, at
790.
98. Balkin & Levinson, supra note 37, at 523 (observing that governance in the National
Surveillance State is “spurred on by technological advances that increasingly lower the cost of
telecommunications, surveillance technology, data storage, and computation power”).
99. Multiple experts have documented the rising corporatization and private delegation of
intelligence activities after 9/11. See, e.g., PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 31, at 178–86; HARRIS,
THE WATCHERS, supra note 31, at 194–98; O’HARROW, supra note 31, at 98–107. Big data
technologies have also increased the incentives for this private delegation. See, e.g., Lyon, supra
note 44, at 9 (“Big Data is currently dominated by commercial and governmental criteria[.] . . . Big
Data is the strong affinity between the two, particularly in relation to surveillance. Big Data
represents a confluence of commercial and governmental interests.”); Hu, Small Data
Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, supra note 30, at 817–18 (asserting that datafication
through big data technologies “[c]an also be understood as the underlying drive to force the issue
and reinforce the underlying values of big data: a policy impetus currently underway that
mandates or delegates, often under law or administrative regulation, the collection or sharing of
more and more data”).
100. See supra notes 46–49.
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costs; restriction of expression, assembly, travel, association, and petition
rights; deprivations; and other administrative actions;101
(6) “Guilty Until Proven Innocent” Status: Big data programs may
facilitate a presumption of guilt when an individual is attached to
suspicious digital data or database screening results, and may implicitly
shift the burden of proof to those who are digitally blacklisted. The
mediation of rights, freedoms, and privileges through largely binary and
probabilistic big data determinations102 and the inferences of suspicion103
that inform big data blacklisting programs are inconsistent with the
presumption of innocence necessary to the principle of liberty. Every
right and privilege is thus affected and at risk of encumbrance. In effect,
the government may be able to precondition both innocence and liberty
upon technological processes by prescribing the criteria and
consequences for database screening or digital watchlisting systems that
inform a big data blacklisting program. Without a presumption of
innocence, there is no presumption of liberty;104
(7) “Black Box” Problem: In a “Black Box Society,”105 often there is
a lack of meaningful notice of the full consequences of the big data
101. Cole, supra note 1, at 518. Cole observes that a “paradigm of prevention” and ex ante
determinations or preventive policy can pose a significant threat to liberty interests generally:
Notwithstanding the ubiquity of preventive motives in ordinary criminal law
enforcement, preventive coercion imposed without a specific criminal act poses
distinct normative concerns. When the state acts on the basis of predictions, it
must necessarily reduce the degree of certainty it demands before imposing
coercion, because there is an inherent uncertainty about the future. To the extent
that it restricts an individual’s liberty based on fear of what she might do in the
future, it disrespects her free will to choose to conform her actions to the law.
102. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 78 (observing the distinction
between “datafication” and digitization, explaining digitization as “the process of converting
analog information into the zeros and ones of binary code so computers can handle it,” and
datafication “is to put it in a quantified format so it can be tabulated and analyzed”).
103. See id. at 157 (“[B]ecause the government never knows whom it will want to scrutinize,
it collects, stores, or ensures access to information not necessarily to monitor everyone at all times,
but so that when someone falls under suspicion, the authorities can immediately investigate rather
than having to start gathering the info from scratch.”). See also Lyon, supra note 44, at 10
(observing that “time-honored commitments to the presumption of innocence, or proof beyond a
reasonable doubt are eroded” when big data surveillance is combined with a “‘penal populism’
that calls for public protection, reinforced by media-enhanced perceptions of risk”) (citing LUCIA
ZEDNER, SECURITY 80 (2009)).
104. Id. at 162 (“The fundamental trouble is that with such a system we essentially punish
people before they do something bad . . . . This negates the very idea of the presumption of
innocence, the principle upon which our legal system, as well as our sense of fairness, is based.”).
105. PASQUALE, supra note 13, at 3. Pasquale states that the “term ‘black box’ is a useful
metaphor . . . given its own dual meaning.” The first meaning is that of a “recording device.” The
second meaning refers to “a system whose workings are mysterious; we can observe its inputs
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blacklisting harm and often a lack of access to the full evidence of how
one came to be digitally blacklisted (e.g., inability to interrogate
algorithms and databases informing big data blacklisting may be
classified). Often processes still appear to be small data in nature because
the big data elements may be obscured;
(8) “Everyone is a Potential Target”:106 Even with technical notice
and minimal remedial procedures, the government may digitally blacklist
anyone with a digital trail or a presence within a database, thus harming
individuals in ways that may be impossible or impracticable to fully
detect and understand;
(9) Small Data Constitution v. Big Data Constitution: Preexisting
constitutional protections and rights were forged in a small data world to
protect against small data harms with small data governing ambitions in
mind. Small data limitations on power were presupposed. The current
jurisprudence does not impose limiting principles on big data governing
ambitions or big data harms that are massive in scope and digitally
derived in nature; and
(10) Largely Invisible Systemic Harms That Are Digitally Derived or
Facilitated Yet Difficult to Remediate Technologically: Big data policy
making and programmatic structures have the capacity to lead to a broad
range of digitally derived or digitally facilitated systemic harms that can
implicate multiple freedoms and privileges. Through the technological
mediation and interference of freedoms and privileges—utilizing
technologies that may be largely invisible to the common individual—
potential consequences may include the chilling of expressive and
associational freedoms, infringing upon individual decision-making and
autonomy interests, and inalienable rights associated with fundamental
liberty interests as broadly construed within the due process framework
of protections. At the same time, technological or procedural remedies
may be unable to redress these harms, for example, because of the
inherent limitations of big data and because of the way in which big data
blacklisting programs may lend legitimacy (e.g., the algorithmic-driven
“predictive judgments” of the science that informs big data may appear
to support a “reasonable suspicion”) to inherently illegitimate and
and outputs, but we cannot tell how one becomes the other.” Id.; see also id. at 6–8
(“Deconstructing the black boxes of Big Data isn’t easy . . . . It matters because authority is
increasingly expressed algorithmically.”); Citron & Pasquale, The Scored Society, supra note 13,
at 33 (“Opening up the black box scoring systems to individuals or neutral experts representing
them is key to permitting them to challenge ‘arbitrariness by algorithm.’”).
106. See, e.g., James Bamford, The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center
(Watch What You Say), WIRED, Mar. 15, 2012, http://www.wired.com/2012/03/ff_nsadatacenter
(“[A]ccording to [one intelligence] official: ‘Everybody’s a target; everybody with [digital]
communication is a target.’”).
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unconstitutional outcomes (e.g., deprivation or infringement of
fundamental liberty and equality guarantees absent adequate
constitutional protections).107
II. DATABASE SCREENING AND DIGITAL WATCHLISTING SYSTEMS
Through big data tools, “blacklisting” consequences can be imposed
by the government absent an actual “blacklist” or even a “list” of names.
Unlike the manner in which “blacklisting” practices unfolded in a small
data world, an overview of the mechanics of potential big data
blacklisting programs demonstrates that the harms of inferential guilt can
flow from digitally generated data. Thus, many of the big data
blacklisting programs discussed below are not necessarily comprised of
a list of individuals who have been placed on a “blacklist” for government
consequences. Rather, these programs utilize big data tools to access and
analyze digital data or databases. Once this data is accessed and analyzed,
the big data tools can be used deliberately or inadvertently to flag the
digitally suspicious. Thus, big data blacklisting programs may, but do not
necessarily, draw up a list of individuals for deprivation purposes. The
database screening and digital watchlisting systems discussed below
show that it is often digitalized data deemed guilty and suspicious that is
flagged by the big data tools, and it is not necessarily guilty or suspicious
persons who are flagged.
Because many of these programs are classified or semi-classified, it is
unclear exactly what digital data or databases, and what statistical
analytical methods or algorithmic tools, the government engages to
determine how to assess the “guilt” of those targeted by these big data
programs. Yet, these programs may facilitate the assessment of a “guilty
until proven innocent” status.108 To illustrate the new pressures that have
been placed on the existing due process jurisprudence in challenging
these big data programs, Part II describes the mechanics of various
government programs that rely upon big data tools. By necessity, a
careful description of these programs is a highly technical undertaking.
A close examination of the big data technologies and the administrative
systems that support their consequences, however, is required in order to
more fully appreciate the constitutional harms that may attach to these
big data blacklisting programs.
These database screening and digital watchlisting systems, for
example, include nonclassified programs—such as the No Work List
107. See Daskal, supra note 33, at 362 (“[P]re-crime restraints also interfere with the
important liberty interest in being treated with equal dignity.”).
108. LYON, supra note 32, at 185 (“[U]sing personal data analysis and algorithms . . . the
potential offender, is singled out for attention by virtue of being identified as part of a group with
certain characteristics . . . the goal is to attach suspicion, perhaps leading to a criminal charge.”)
(citations omitted).
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(e.,g., E-Verify), the No Vote List (e.g., SAVE, HAVA, etc.), and the No
Citizenship List (e.g., S-COMM/PEP, etc.)—and classified or semiclassified programs—such as the No Fly List and the Terrorist Watchlist.
In the discussion below, it is important to recognize, however, that the
big data technologies (e.g., E-Verify and HAVA) discussed here are
simply representative technologies. SAVE/HAVA database screening is
not coterminous with the “No Vote List” per se. The technologies are
rapidly evolving. Multiple big data tools that may potentially
disenfranchise voters will not be discussed below (e.g., Interstate
Crosscheck [database screening] Program is not discussed below,
however, some may argue that it is a “No Vote List”).109 The specific
database screening systems that are deployed today may not be deployed
in the future. Thus, the focus of the inquiry in this Article is a
constitutional one, for instance, how a big data-driven “No Vote List”
database screening system may impact fundamental liberty interests.
Finally, it is worth noting that technologies and programs that once
were not considered “big data” in a small data world (e.g., computerized
identity data matching systems) have now been transformed in a big data
world (e.g., big data mass integration systems using complex algorithmic
tools to conduct identity verification).110 The E-Verify database screening
system, for example, was recently identified as a “big data” program in
the White House’s report Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving
Values.111 In a small data world, this program may not have appeared to
be sufficiently “big data”-oriented to qualify as a big data program.
A. Nonclassified Big Data Programs
Core constitutional rights and freedoms in a small data world may, in
the National Surveillance State,112 fare differently from rights and
freedoms in a big data world.113 A small data world is free of massive
109. See, e.g., KRIS W. KOBACH, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE ELECTION DIRS., INTERSTATE VOTER
REGISTRATION CROSSCHECK PROGRAM (2013), available at http://www.nased.org/NASED_
Winter_2013_PP_Presentations/KANSAS.pdf.
110. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L.J. 1475, 1489–99
(2013) (discussing the functionality of various identity verification and identity determination
systems through a biometric ID cybersurveillance structure).
111. PODESTA REPORT, supra note 6, at 52–53 (discussing concerns surrounding E-Verify).
112. Balkin explains that the “National Surveillance State” necessarily impacts core rights
and freedoms, as the digital age has ushered in a “new form of governance” that harnesses
information technologies to serve governmental goals. Balkin, supra note 37, at 3 (“This new
form of governance is the National Surveillance State. In the National Surveillance State, the
government uses surveillance, data collection, collation, and analysis to identify problems, to head
off potential threats, to govern populations, and to deliver valuable social services.”).
113. The appropriate uses of dataveillance and cybersurveillance in determining public
policy choices—and the legality and constitutionality of these emerging data-driven
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databases, invisible dataveillance and cybersurveillance systems, and
automated or semi-automated data screening programs. In a small data
world, individuals take for granted the ability to live freely and access
fundamental liberty interests directly without digital mediation or
technological obstruction. In a small data world, a citizen can exercise a
constitutional right or freedom without database screening, digital data
analysis, or other technological interference by the government or its
delegates.114
In contrast, in a big data world, the government can digitally
mediate—and consequently threaten—privileges, rights, liberty interests,
and freedoms.115 The processes in which fundamental rights can be
deprived in a small data world are radically different from the processes
in which fundamental rights can be deprived in a big data world. In a big
data world, government analysis and decision-making processes can
unfold virtually and invisibly,116 for instance, through data screening
systems. The government may gather data-driven evidence to determine
guilt in an administrative manner, often embedded within a highly
bureaucratized structure,117 in a way that is almost impossible to contest.
The right to work and vote, for example, are rights many citizens
perceive as fundamental. The discussion below describes how the
government and its delegates can utilize big data screening tools and
database-driven, risk-based assessments to impair work opportunities,
deny the right to vote, and abridge the rights and privileges of citizenship.
1. No Work List
The E-Verify program, jointly operated by the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Social Security Administration (SSA),

technologies—have informed the work of multiple experts in recent years. See generally, e.g.,
MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 2, at 8–9; MOROZOV, supra note 40; Kerr, Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies, supra note 55, at 802–08; Omer Tene, Big Data for All:
Privacy and User Control, STAN. L., CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (Sept. 20, 2012, 4:05 PM),
http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2012/09/big-data-all-privacy-and-user-control-age-analytics.
114. See, e.g., Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 28, at 1281; Daniel J. Solove,
Digital Dossiers, supra note 8, at 1107 & n.130 (“[B]y obtaining private sector records, the
government can conduct the type of ‘fishing expeditions’ that the Framers feared.”).
115. See, e.g., Balkin, supra note 37, at 12; Balkin & Levinson, supra note 37, at 490; Wittes,
supra note 57, at 2.
116. See Balkin, supra note 37, at 12.
117. LYON, supra note 32, at 74–75 (contending that new forms of surveillance are “‘filebased’ or bureaucratic surveillance” and elaborating that “modern surveillance methods are
rationalized using accounting methods and file-based coordination”); see also SOLOVE, DIGITAL
PERSON, supra note 39, at 13–21 (describing the manner in which modern privacy violations occur
as a result of corporate and bureaucratic action).
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is referred to as the “No Work List” in various outlets.118 E-Verify is
similar to the No Fly List in its adverse impact on U.S. citizens and lawful
immigrants.119 Critics of E-Verify claim that the database screening
system has wrongly disenfranchised individuals of the opportunity to
work in a similar manner that the critics of the No Fly List claim the
digital watchlisting system has wrongly disenfranchised citizens of the
opportunity to fly.120
E-Verify is an Internet-based identity verification system121 that relies
upon database screening protocols.122 The E-Verify system attempts to
“verify” the identity or citizenship status of a worker based upon complex
statistical algorithms and multiple databases.123 Put into simple terms:
First, an enrolled employer collects personally identifiable data from an
employee—e.g., the employee’s name, date of birth, photo identification,
and SSN.124 Next, that employer (or its designated agent) enters the
gathered information into either the web service or browser based
software system.125 The data is matched to the SSA database and various
DHS immigration databases to determine whether the employee may
legally work.126
118. See, e.g., Press Release, ACLU, Employment Verification Would Create a ‘No Work
List’ in the United States (May 6, 2008), https://www.aclu.org/immigrants-rights/employmentverification-would-create-‘no-work-list’-us; Jim Harper, Immigration Reform: REAL ID and a
Federal ‘No Work’ List, CATO INST. (June 14, 2007), http://www.cato.org/publications/techknow
ledge/immigration-reform-real-id-federal-no-work-list. For an overview of the E-Verify program
and some of its legal implications, see generally Stumpf, Getting to Work, supra note 16 (outlining
the procedures and policies of E-Verify).
119. See Harper, supra note 118.
120. See, e.g., id.
121. Identity verification systems seek to confirm or authenticate identity data presented by
an individual, checking produced data against an existing database. See, e.g., JENNIFER LYNCH,
FROM FINGERPRINTS TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN U.S. IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES
AND BEYOND 5 (2012).
122. WESTAT, WESTAT EVALUATION OF THE E-VERIFY PROGRAM: USCIS SYNOPSIS OF KEY
FINDINGS AND PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS 1 (2010) [hereinafter WESTAT, EVALUATION OF E-VERIFY],
available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Native%20Docs/Westat%20Evaluation%20of%20
the%20E-Verify%20Program.pdf.
123. See E-Verify: Preserving Jobs for American Workers, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration Policy & Enforcement of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 34–35 (2011)
(statement of Theresa C. Bertucci, Assoc. Dir., Enter. Servs. Directorate, U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs.); WESTAT, EVALUATION OF E-VERIFY, supra note 122, at 1, 5.
124. See U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., I AM AN EMPLOYER: HOW DO I USE EVERIFY? 1–2 (2013), available at http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Resources/E4en.pdf.
125. Id. at 1.
126. SSA maintains the Numerical Identification File (NUMIDENT) SSN database, which
includes the name, date of birth, and other biographical information of SSA applicants. ANDORRA
BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40446, ELECTRONIC EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY VERIFICATION
2 (2009). The United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) maintains the
Verification Information System (VIS) database, which “is comprised of citizenship,
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Generally, the results of the inquiry are returned to the employer
within seconds, and the employee’s identity is either “verified”127 or “not
verified.” If there is an anomalous result from the database screening
algorithms, the employee falls into a category referred to as “Tentative
Nonconfirmation” (TNC).128 Upon a TNC result, the employer is
required to allow the employee to contest the finding.129 It is the
responsibility of the employee to contact DHS or SSA “within 8 federal
government workdays to correct the TNC.”130 If the TNC remains
unresolved, the system generates a “Final Nonconfirmation” (FNC)
finding.131 If an employee does not contact DHS or SSA, the system
generates a “No Show” result after ten business days have passed.132 An
employer can terminate an employee after the employee receives either a
“No Show” or FNC result.133
If DHS concludes that the employee did not take sufficient steps to
correct the mismatch, and if the E-Verify system issues a FNC to the
employer, then there is no formal process to contest or appeal such a
determination.134 For those employees who have affirmatively elected to
contest the TNC through signing an E-Verify form generated by the Eimmigration, and employment status information from several DHS System of Records.” U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE VERIFICATION INFORMATION
SYSTEM SUPPORTING VERIFICATION PROGRAMS 2 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/privacy/privacy_pia_uscis_vis.pdf.
127. The Verification Process, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/employers/verification-process (last visited
Oct. 16, 2015).
128. Id.
129. Employee Rights and Responsibilities, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/employees/employee-rights-and-responsibilities (last visited Oct.
16, 2015).
130. How to Correct a Tentative Nonconfirmation, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/employees/how-correct-tentative-nonconfirmation (last
visited Oct. 16, 2015).
131. DHS TNCS, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/everify/employers/tentative-nonconfirmations/dhs-tncs (last visited Oct. 16, 2015); see also DEP’T
OF HOMELAND SEC., THE E-VERIFY MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING FOR EMPLOYERS (2013)
[hereinafter DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., E-VERIFY EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION MEMORANDUM],
available at http://www.uscis.gov/site/default/files/USCIS/Verification/E-Verify/E-Verify_
Native_Documents/MOU_for_E-Verify_Employer.pdf (“If the employee does not choose to
contest a tentative nonconfirmation or a photo non-match or if a secondary verification is
completed and a final nonconfirmation is issued, then the Employer can find the employee is not
work authorized and terminate the employee’s employment.”).
132. DHS TNCs, supra note 131.
133. Id.
134. John Fay, USCIS Considers Secondary Review Process for E-Verify Final
Nonconfirmations, LAWLOGIX (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.lawlogix.com/blog/uscis-considerssecondary-review-process-e-verify-final-nonconfirmations.
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Verify system, the federal government is then provided two days after the
original eight business days have passed (for a total of ten business days)
to make a manual determination as to the individual’s work
authorization.135
Despite significant challenges faced by the program thus far, E-Verify
is poised for mandatory national expansion. At the federal level, E-Verify
is a voluntary pilot program.136 Yet, multiple state laws have begun to
mandate that employers within their state use the system. 137 In Chamber
of Commerce v. Whiting, the Supreme Court upheld the Legal Arizona
Workers Act,138 which requires all employers in Arizona to run all new
worker’s information through the E-Verify program.139
Past and current legislative proposals recommend the national,
mandatory expansion of E-Verify, for example through the New
Employee Verification Act140 and proposed comprehensive immigration
reform bills, including the Bipartisan Senate Immigration Plan introduced
in April 2013, titled Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and
Immigration Modernization Act.141 Further, it is significant to note that
E-Verify use is rapidly expanding. As of September 2015, over 600,000
135. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., E-VERIFY EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION MEMORANDUM,
supra note 131, at 9. The manual determination can include putting a case in continuance if more
time is necessary, for example, if the employee has applied for and is waiting on a replacement
document. See DHS TNCS, supra note 131.
136. Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1975 (2011) (“Originally known
as the Basic Pilot Program, E–Verify is an internet-based system that allows an employer to verify
an employee’s work-authorization status.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Congress
expressly prohibited DHS from requiring private employers to use E-Verify on anything other
than a voluntary basis. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 402, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1324a); see also Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1985 (“‘[T]he Secretary of Homeland Security
may not require any person or . . . entity’ outside the Federal Government ‘to participate in’ EVerify.” (quoting IIRIRA § 402(a), (e))).
137. See, e.g., Hu, Reverse-Commandeering, supra note 16, at 608–09 (“The state-by-state
patchwork of E-Verify schemes is especially problematic, as several states require some or all
employers use E-Verify. Alabama, Arizona, and Mississippi require all employers to use EVerify. Georgia, Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Utah require most
employers to use E-Verify. . . . Many other states require subsets of employers—such as public
employers, contractors, and subcontractors—to enroll in E-Verify. These states include Colorado,
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West
Virginia.” (footnotes omitted)).
138. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-211 to -216 (2015) (prohibiting employers from
knowingly hiring an “unauthorized alien”).
139. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. at 1972, 1985 (holding that an Arizona immigration statute requiring
employers engage in mandatory E-Verify database screening is not preempted by federal
immigration law because federal law only prohibits the federal government from mandating
E-Verify, and nothing in the federal law prohibits states from mandating E-Verify); see also Hu,
Reverse-Commandeering, supra note 16, at 598–99.
140. H.R. 2028, 111th Cong. § 103 (1st Sess. 2009).
141. S. 744, 113th Cong. § 3 (1st Sess. 2013).
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employers use E-Verify at more than 1.4 million hiring sites to screen
new hires over the Internet.142 Approximately 1400 new companies join
this pilot program per week.143 The 52 million U.S. workers hired in 2012
were subjected to approximately 21.2 million queries in the E-Verify
system.144
2. No Vote List
Immediately following the Supreme Court’s June 2013 ruling in
Shelby County v. Holder145 that struck down Section 4(b) of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,146 multiple states announced their intention to
remove noncitizens from voter registration rolls through a database
screening system referred to as the SAVE database. DHS maintains and
operates the SAVE database.147 Since the creation of SAVE through the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA),148 SAVE has provided benefits-granting agencies at the
federal, state, and local level with a method to verify eligibility for
142. What Is E-Verify?, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/
what-e-verify (last updated June 25, 2015).
143. Id.
144. Alex Nowrasteh, CATO FOIA Request Reveals E-Verify Delays Hurt Workers, CATO
INST. (Jan. 17, 2014, 12:16 PM), http://www.cato.org/blog/cato-foia-request-reveals-e-verifydelays-hurt-workers.
145. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (holding that the Voting Rights
Act’s federal preclearance formula for state election procedures as unconstitutional under the
Tenth Amendment). Multiple scholars have investigated the constitutional and other legal
implications of the Voting Rights Act immediately preceding and after the decision in Shelby
County. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting
Rights After Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2841–42 (2014) (arguing that “the response to Shelby
County will fail unless it goes well beyond universal protections of voting rights[,]” and that “the
voting rights regime must also provide robust protection against race discrimination
specifically”); Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s Rights, Last Rites, and
Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 485–86 (2014) (arguing that Shelby County should be
viewed “as deeply destabilizing to the infrastructure of voting rights law and policy[,]” and
undermines the “basic assumptions” that have traditionally included: the “primacy” of “the federal
government over the states with respect to the authority to regulate elections[,]” “accord[ing]
Congress a fair amount of deference” in addressing “racial discrimination in democratic
politics[,]” and the three branches “have generally operated from a similar and fluid conception
of racial discrimination”); Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127
HARV. L. REV. 95, 121 (2013) (proposing a regulatory approach that requires a disclosure system
involving a “voting impact statement” of the “likely anticipated effect on access to the ballot and
any known anticipated impact on minority voters in particular”).
146. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631.
147. What Is SAVE?, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERVS., http://www.uscis.gov/save/what-save/what-save (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
148. IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).

1768

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

government aid programs, such as Medicaid, through identity and
immigration alien number database screening.149
In July 2012, one month after the U.S. Supreme Court issued Shelby
County, thirteen states led by Colorado petitioned DHS for access to its
SAVE database screening protocols for the purpose of identifying
possible noncitizens to purge from voter rolls.150 Specifically, DHS
informed a federal district court that Florida would have access to the
SAVE database screening system.151 Shortly thereafter, DHS entered into
a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Florida permitting it access
to SAVE for the purposes of verifying its voter registration rolls.152 In
August 2012, DHS entered into a similar MOA with Colorado.153
Florida and Colorado utilize the SAVE database by first drawing upon
immigration-related information provided by each state’s Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV).154 Next, the state election official compares the
names of noncitizens in DMV records to the names of registered
voters.155 State election officials purge individuals from the voter
registration polls by determining if a voter failed to gain citizenship after
obtaining a driver’s license (e.g., if the voter remains in the SAVE
database as an immigrant).156 Under SAVE, an Internet-based query
searches over 100 million records contained in DHS databases.157 The
database screening protocol attempts to determine if there is a match
between the personally identifiable data entered into the database
screening system and DHS records on an individual’s immigration
status.158
149. See, e.g., Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 § 404, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
110 Stat. 3009.
150. See Letter from Scott Gessler, Colo. Sec’y of State, to Janet Napolitano, U.S. Sec’y of
Homeland Sec. (July 9, 2012), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/99815699/SOS-SecNapolitano-Ltr-7-9-12-FINAL.
151. See Charles Babington, AP Newsbreak: In Victory for GOP, Florida Wins Access to
Homeland Security List of Noncitizens, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 14, 2012, 8:17 PM), available at
http://m.startribune.com/nation/162465396.html; Letter from Alejandro Mayorkas, U.S.
Citizenship & Immigration Servs. Dir., to Ken Detzner, Fla. Sec’y of State (June 12, 2012),
available at http://bradblog.com/Docs/USCIS_Mayorkas_LetterTo_FLDetzner_061212.pdf.
152. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Dep’t of Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., and Fla. Dep’t of State, Div. of Elections (Aug. 14, 2012), available at
https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/805148/moa-dhs-fl-1.pdf; see also
Corey Dade, States to Use U.S. Immigration List for Voter Purges, NPR (July 17, 2012, 3:51 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2012/07/17/156880856/states-to-use-u-s-immigration-list-for-voter-purges.
153. Memorandum of Agreement Between the Dep’t Homeland Sec., U.S. Citizenship &
Immigration Servs., and Colorado Secretary of State (Aug. 22, 2012).
154. See, e.g., Marouf, supra note 17, at 67.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 67–68.
157. What is SAVE?, supra note 147.
158. See id.
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DHS has granted SAVE database screening access to a total of five
states for voter registration purges. In addition to Florida and Colorado,
three states—Iowa,159 North Carolina,160 and Virginia161—have entered
into an MOA agreement with DHS to access the SAVE database. Five
counties in Arizona have also entered into an MOA to use the SAVE
database for the same purpose.162 At least eleven additional states have
requested access to the SAVE database for voter purges, including
Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Nevada, New Mexico,
Ohio, Texas, Utah, and Washington.163
In addition to SAVE, state election officials currently conduct
database screening protocols pursuant to the HAVA.164 Per Section
15483(a) of HAVA, each state is required to create and maintain an
electronic database that contains all registered voters.165 States are also
required to verify the identity of voter registration applicants by cross
checking the last four digits of the applicant’s SSN or driver’s license.166
The state agency tasked with overseeing elections and procedures is
required by HAVA to coordinate with SSA for SSN database screening
purposes.167 If a prospective voter does not have a SSN or a driver’s
license, the state must assign a voter ID number to the applicant. Critics
of voter purges under SAVE and HAVA note that neither the SAVE
database screening system nor the HAVA–SSA database screening

159. Muzaffar Chishti & Faye Hipsman, State Access to Federal Immigration Data Stirs
New Controversy in Debate over Voting Rights, MIGRATION POLICY INST. (Sept. 12, 2013) http://
www.migrationpolicy.org/article/state-access-federal-immigration-data-stirs-new-controversydebate-over-voting-rights.
160. Id.
161. Kara Brandeisky et al., Everything That’s Happened Since Supreme Court Ruled on
Voting Rights Act, PROPUBLICA.ORG (Nov. 4, 2013, 12:31 PM), http://www.propublica.org/
article/voting-rights-by-state-map.
162. Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 159; see also Using the Systematic Alien Verification
for Entitlements (SAVE) Program for Voter Eligibility Verification, IMMIGRATION POLICY CTR.
(Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/using-systematic-alien-verificationentitlements-save-program-voter-eligibility-verificat.
163. Chishti & Hipsman, supra note 159.
164. HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666, 1666–730 (2002) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2012)).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 15483(a) (2012).
166. Id. § 15483(a)(5)(A)(i). The HAVA database screening protocol statutorily requires that
state election officials match the voter registration to other database lists with the purported intent
to more robustly protect voter integrity. Daniel P. Tokaji, Voter Registration and Election Reform,
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 453, 478–80 (2008). The protocol does not, however, stipulate how the
matches are to be conducted through a database screening system nor does it specify what steps
are appropriate once a database match is found. Id.
167. See President Signs HAVA, supra note 18.
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system was designed to verify identity or citizenship status for voter
registration purposes.168
3. No Citizenship List
S-COMM is an interoperability program that facilitates data sharing
and database screening protocols between the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), DHS, and local law enforcement agencies.169 As of
2013, pursuant to a mandate by DHS, S-COMM’s database screening
protocols were required by all state and local law enforcement
agencies.170 Consequently, after the mandate, what was formerly a pilot
program was converted into a mandatory program.171 The mandatory
database screening protocols required state and local law enforcement
agencies to run fingerprints collected from suspects against federal
fingerprint databases.172
Federal courts have expressed Fourth Amendment and other
constitutional concerns about detention periods under S-COMM.173 DHS
responded with policy changes to S-COMM in 2014.174 First, S-COMM
168. See, e.g., Janell Ross, Voter Roll Purges Could Spread to at Least 12 States,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 31, 2012, 8:01 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/31/voterroll-purge_n_1721192.html.
169. S-COMM commenced as a pilot program in March 2008 under President George W.
Bush and was piloted in fourteen jurisdictions by October 2008. AARTI KOHLI ET AL., CHIEF
JUSTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW & SOC. POLICY, SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS:
AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 1 (2011), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf.
170. See Kirk Semple & Julia Preston, Deal to Share Fingerprints Is Dropped, Not Program,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/06/us/06immig.html.
171. In 2010, before the efficacy of the piloted program could be fully assessed, DHS
determined that all state and local law enforcement agencies would be required to implement SCOMM by 2013. See Memorandum from Riah Ramlogan, Deputy Principal Legal Advisor, on
Secure Communities—Mandatory in 2013 to Beth N. Gibson, Assistant Deputy Dir., U.S.
Immigration
&
Customs
Enforcement,
(Oct.
2,
2010),
available
at
http://images.politico.com/global/2012/01/icefoiaoptoutdocs.pdf; see also Julia Preston,
Resistance Widens to Obama Initiative on Criminal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/us/politics/13secure.html.
172. LYNCH, supra note 121, at 9.
173. E.g., Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cnty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305,
at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); Morales v. Chadbourne, 996 F. Supp. 2d 19, 28–32 (D.R.I. 2014);
see also Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 19, at 2 (responding to federal court
holdings that “detainer-based detention . . . violates the Fourth Amendment” by directing ICE to
“replace requests for detention . . . with requests for notification (i.e., requests that state or local
law enforcement notify ICE of a pending release during the time that person is otherwise in
custody under state or local authority).”).
174. See, e.g., Juliet P. Stumpf, D(e)volving Discretion: Lessons from the Life and Times of
Secure Communities, 64 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1259, 1262 (2015) (describing the policy decisions that
led to the “demise” of S-COMM and the adoption of the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP)).
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was renamed “Priority Enforcement Program” (PEP).175 Although DHS
stated that the program was “discontinued as we know it,” the changes
did not appear to impact the database screening protocols of S-COMM.176
Next, DHS explained that the new program by U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) impacts detainer requests by limiting
enforcement actions: “[U]nless the alien poses a demonstrable risk to
national security, enforcement actions through the new program will only
be taken against aliens who are convicted of specifically enumerated
crimes.”177 However, “ICE . . . will continue to rely on fingerprint-based
biometric data submitted during bookings by state and local law
enforcement agencies to the [FBI] . . . for criminal background
checks.”178
In short, S-COMM—now the newly renamed PEP—requires local
and state law enforcement agencies to run biometric and biographical
data of arrestees through federal government databases to determine an
individual’s identity.179 Although a gross simplification, S-COMM/PEP
database screening works in the following way. Local law enforcement
agencies (LEA), upon arresting a suspect, collect and scan the suspect’s
fingerprints. The LEA submits the fingerprints, and they are checked
against the FBI and DHS databases.180 If the fingerprints match one in
the database, the FBI sends an Immigration Alien Query to the Law
Enforcement Support Center (LESC). For detention and deportation
175. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, supra note 19, at 3.
176. Id. at 1.
177. Id. at 2.
178. Id.
179. See LYNCH, supra note 121, at 6–8.
180. The FBI maintains the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)
database. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis (last visited
Oct. 16, 2015). DHS maintains the Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT)
database. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE AUTOMATED
BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT) 2 (2006) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR IDENT], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets
/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_final.pdf (“IDENT is a Department of Homeland Security
(DHS)-wide system for the collection and processing of biometric and limited biographic
information for DHS . . . .”). The database screening process can be summarized as follows:
“1. . . . [T]he arresting LEA sends the subject’s fingerprints and associated biographical
information to [Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS)]/IAFIS . . . . 2. CJIS electronically
routes the subject’s biometric and biographic information for all criminal answer required (CAR)
transactions to US-VISIT/IDENT to determine if there is a fingerprint match with records in that
system.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE
COMMUNITIES: QUARTERLY REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2010 REPORT TO CONGRESS FOURTH QUARTER
2–3 (2011) [hereinafter ICE, SECURE COMMUNITIES: QUARTERLY REPORT], available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_communities/congressionalstatusreportfy104thquarter.pdf.
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determinations, multiple databases are researched by the LESC, managed
by DHS’s ICE.181
Multiple state immigration laws now require state and local law
enforcement officials to engage in the biometric data screening protocols
that are operative in S-COMM/PEP.182 Some of these laws, however, do
so in a way that expands the scope of S-COMM/PEP.183 For instance, in
Arizona v. United States,184 the Court upheld § 2(B) of Arizona Senate
Bill 1070.185 This controversial state law was referred to in the media as
the “racial profiling” law and the “show me your papers” law.186 Whereas
PEP targets only those individuals “arrested and booked by a law
enforcement officer for a criminal violation,”187 Section 2(B) states that
181. ICE, SECURE COMMUNITIES: QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 180, at 4–5.
182. For example, Arizona Senate Bill 1070 (SB 1070) includes such a database screening
provision, Section 2(B), in the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch.
113, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450 (codified in scattered sections of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 11,
13, 23, 28, 41 (2010)), amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1070.
Specifically, Section 2(B) is codified in ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2015). For an
overview of Section 2(B), see MOTOMURA, supra note 20, at 64–65, 113–15, 125–26, 138–39,
151–52; Hu, supra note 16, at 596–604. Several scholars have dedicated important research to SB
1070 specifically, and local immigration regulation and immigration federalism, and its
implications. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, The Transformation of Immigration Federalism, 21
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 577 (2012); Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality
of State Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 253–54 (2011);
Lucas Guttentag, Immigration Preemption and the Limits of State Power: Reflections on Arizona
v. United States, 9 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 7–15 (2013); Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking
Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803 (2013); Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration and Civil Rights:
State and Local Efforts to Regulate Immigration, 46 GA. L. REV. 609, 632–35 (2012); David
Martin, Reading Arizona, 98 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 41 (2012); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The
Significance of the Local Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567 (2008); Pratheepan
Gulasekaram & Karthick Ramakrishnan, The President and Immigration Federalism, 68 FLA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2016).
183. Section 2(B) of SB 1070, for instance, uses the same database screening protocol as SCOMM pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) (2012) and mandates this database screening protocol
through express incorporation of the federal immigration statute into the language of the state
immigration statute.
184. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
185. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2015).
186. Id. at 2507–10 (holding that it was improper to enjoin Section 2(B) on preemption
grounds because if Section 2(B) “only requires state officers to conduct a status check during the
course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released, the provision likely
would survive preemption—at least absent some showing that it has other consequences that are
adverse to federal law and its objectives”).
187. Priority Enforcement Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/pep (last visited Oct. 16, 2015) (“PEP begins at the
state and local level when an individual is arrested and booked by a law enforcement officer for a
criminal violation and his or her fingerprints are submitted to the FBI for criminal history and warrant
checks. This same biometric data is also sent to U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
so that ICE can determine whether the individual is a priority for removal . . . .”).
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“where reasonable suspicion exists that the person is an alien who is
unlawfully present in the United States, a reasonable attempt shall be
made, when practicable, to determine the immigration status of the
person.”188
B. Classified and Semi-Classified Big Data Programs
Big data cybersurveillance and dataveillance tools facilitate the
government’s ability to target those deemed suspicious by virtue of
suspect digital data and metadata. Yet, the challenges associated with
automated or semi-automated decision-making and algorithmic
intelligence through government-led big data systems can be almost
impossible to remediate. In other words, the digital mediation of core
constitutional rights through big data tools can impact both the manner in
which the government administers and justifies the conferral of rights and
privileges, and the manner in which the government conducts and
justifies the deprivation of rights and privileges.
This problem is particularly acute when the fundamental rights
involve the potential deprivation of life and liberty without the due
process of law. The constitutional guarantee of due process of law is
especially challenged, however, when the government exercises
deprivations of life and liberty under classified programs that promote
sensitive national security objectives. The discussion below describes
how the government can utilize big data screening tools and databasedriven, risk-based assessments to justify digital watchlisting and database
screening systems to categorize individuals as potential national security
threats and to single out these individuals for deprivations, such as the
denial of the right to fly.
1. Terrorist Watchlist
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in order to
administratively formalize terrorist screening and watchlisting, President
George W. Bush issued a directive, Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 6 (HSPD-6), to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), requiring
the “establish[ment of] an organization to consolidate the Government’s

188. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-1051(B) (2015); see also Hu, Reverse-Commandeering,
supra note 16, at 594 (“In Section 2(B) of SB 1070, Arizona mandates that local law enforcement
determine—during the course of any lawful stop, arrest, or detention—whether an individual is
lawfully present in the U.S., if the officer has reasonable cause to believe the individual may be
unlawfully present. Section 2(B), as upheld in Arizona, first requires an inspection of physical
documents (e.g., driver’s license or immigration document). A follow-up database screening is
mandated under Section 2(B) if an inspection of the physical identity document cannot confirm
an individual’s identity and citizenship status.”).

1774

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

approach to terrorist screening.”189 Pursuant to HSPD-6, the DOJ
established the Terrorism Screening Center (TSC) as a multi-agency
center for coordinating information pertaining to terrorist activity.190
Then-U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft established the TSC to
oversee FBI-related terrorist data collection and screening.191 HSPD-6
specifically mandated the development of a TSDB as a consolidated
terrorist watchlist maintained by the TSC,192 combining as many as
189. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6—Directive on Integration and Use
of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1234, 1234
(Sept. 16, 2003) [hereinafter Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6], available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book2/pdf/PPP-2003-book2-doc-pg1174.pdf. The
National Counterterrorism Center summarizes the intent of HSPD-6 in the following way:
The intent of HSPD-6 was to consolidate all TERRORISM INFORMATION at the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC)—whose functions were assumed by
the [National Counterterrorism Center]—in a classified database that would then
extract Unclassified, For Official Use Only (U//FOUO) TERRORIST IDENTIFIERS
for passage to the new organization created by the Attorney General. Thus,
concurrent with the issuance of HSPD-6, the TSC was established via the
Memorandum of Understanding on the Integration and Use of Screening
Information to Protect Against Terrorism (TSC [Terrorist Screening Center]
MOU), which was signed by the Attorney General, the Secretaries of State and
Homeland Security, and the Director of Central Intelligence (on behalf of the
[Intelligence Community]).
NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE 6 (Mar. 2013), available
at https://firstlook.org/theintercept/document/2014/07/23/march-2013-watchlistingguidance/.
190. Id.
191. According to the FBI, the agency maintains the Terrorist Screening Center as a “24/7
Operations Center . . . and operates the U.S. Government’s consolidated Terrorist Screening
Database (TSDB), often referred to as the ‘Terrorist Watchlist,’ and serves as a bridge between
law enforcement, Homeland Security, the Intelligence Community, and international partners.”
About the Terrorist Screening Center, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
available at https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc/about-the-terrorist-screening-center; see also
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 5, Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 11-35407),
available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/latif_v__holder_brief_of_plaintiffs-appellants_
filed.pdf.
192. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6, supra note 189. HSPD-6
directs the Attorney General
to (1) develop, integrate, and maintain thorough, accurate, and current
information about individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or have
been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to
terrorism (Terrorist Information); and (2) use that information as appropriate and
to the full extent permitted by law to support (a) Federal, State, local, territorial,
tribal, foreign-government, and private-sector screening processes, and (b)
diplomatic, military, intelligence, law enforcement, immigration, visa, and
protective processes.
Id.
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twelve preexisting watchlists, including the No Fly List.193 The FBI,
along with other federal agencies, was specifically tasked with
coordination of the TSC data collection and the screening processes of
multiple streams of data (e.g., immigration and border control data,
passport and visa data, and No Fly List and Transportation Security
Administration data).194 The TSC-maintained database combined the No
Fly List with other digitally generated watchlists to create one centralized
repository for all suspected international and domestic terrorists.195
2. No Fly List
Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the federal
government maintained a modest version of the current list known widely
as the No Fly List.196 Previously, the FBI issued directives to air carriers
prohibiting the transport of sixteen specific individuals due to the
potential terrorist threat they posed to civil aviation.197 Directly after the
terrorist attacks, the FBI launched the “Pentagon/Twin Towers Bombing

193. Mohamed v. Holder, 995 F. Supp. 2d 520, 525 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“In creating the
[Terrorist Screening Database], the government consolidated as many as twelve preexisting
watchlists, including the No Fly List.”).
194. See NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., WATCHLISTING GUIDANCE, supra note 189, at 15.
195. Id. at 50 (explaining that the Terrorist Screening Center Policy Board Working Group
maintains the criteria and implementation guidance for the No Fly List and Selectee List); id. at
app. 7, at 2 (“The TSDB consolidates the U.S. Government’s terrorism screening and lookout
databases into a single integrated identities database. The TSDB is also known as the
‘watchlist.’”).
196. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSP. SEC. INTELLIGENCE SERV., POWERPOINT: TSA
WATCH LISTS 2 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF TRANS., TSA WATCH LISTS], available at
http://www.aclunc.org/cases/landmark_cases/asset_ upload_file371_3549.pdf (released into the
public record by the ACLU as part of a settlement agreement in Gordon v. FBI, No. C-03-1779
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2006)); see also Mohamed, 995 F. Supp. 2d at 525. In Mohamed, the Court
provides the following historical summary of the No Fly List:
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress and the President
mandated that federal executive departments and agencies share terrorism
information with those in the counterterrorism community responsible for
national security. Piehota Decl., ¶ 4. Specifically, Congress directed the TSA,
“in consultation with other appropriate Federal agencies and air carriers,
establish policies and procedures requiring air carriers (A) to use information
from government agencies to identify individuals on passenger lists who may be
a threat to civil aviation or national security; and (B) if such an individual is
identified, notify appropriate law enforcement agencies, prevent the individual
from boarding an aircraft, or take other appropriate action with respect to that
individual.”
Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 114(h)(3) (2012)).
197. See id.
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Investigation” (PENTTBOM).198 As an outgrowth of the PENTTBOM
investigation and as the FBI developed leads on the potential identity of
the 9/11 hijackers, the agency created a separate “Terrorist Watchlist.”199
The FBI subsequently passed the information to the Federal Aviation
Administration, which disseminated the information to air carriers.200
Soon thereafter, the “no transport list” grew from sixteen names on
September 10, 2001, to almost 600 names by December 2001.201 By that
time, the lists of potential terrorists had been reclassified because the
government separated transport risks into two lists: a “No Fly List” and a
“Selectee List.”202 The No Fly List maintained the names of individuals
that air carriers were to deny transport.203 The “Selectee List” contained
names of individuals that air carriers were to select for additional
screening prior to boarding an aircraft and additional luggage
screening.204
C. Commonality of Big Data Consequences
Admittedly, each big data blacklisting program discussed in this
Article entails distinct administrative and technological structures
informed by separate databases, differing algorithms, and different uses
of data, including differing data collection and analysis protocols. This
Article recognizes that because each program operates within different
factual contexts, there is necessarily a differing administrative structure
guiding remediation. From a description of the operational impact of
nonclassified programs—such as the No Work List, No Vote List, and
No Citizenship List—and classified and semi-classified programs—such
as the No Fly List and Terrorist Watchlist—the discussion above
demonstrates how big data programs operated by the government can
assign a heightened suspicion and facilitate inferences of guilt.
Heightened suspicion may result from either a data match or a data nomatch in a database screening program or digital watchlisting system.
Inferences of guilt may appear as labeling an individual as a potential
terrorist suspect, a future threat to national security, unlawfully present in
the United States, a criminal alien, or as committing identity fraud. As
discussed below, data mismatches can trigger heightened suspicion under
198. 9/11
Investigation
(PENTTBOM),
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/history/famous-cases/9-11-investigation (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
199. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANS., TSA WATCH LISTS, supra note 196, at 2.
200. See id.
201. Id. at 3.
202. Id.
203. Shane, supra note 10, at 812.
204. Id.
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the database screening protocols in the No Work List (e.g., E-Verify) and
the No Vote List (e.g., HAVA).205 Data matches can also trigger
heightened suspicion in database screening protocols in the No Vote List
(e.g., SAVE)206 and the No Citizenship List (e.g., S-COMM/PEP).207
III. BIG DATA BLACKLISTING RISKS
Part III explores how big data blacklisting describes those categorized
by the government as administratively “guilty until proven innocent” by
virtue of suspicious digital data. The big data blacklisting risks described
below may appear to be procedural in nature (e.g., failure of notice or
failure to offer an appropriate appeals process). However, this Article
invites a different perspective—one that views big data harms as
imposing administratively a “guilty until proven innocent” status upon
entire classes and subclasses of individuals in a way that is inconsistent
with fundamental liberty interest protections under substantive due
process.
A. Risks of Nonclassified Big Data Programs
To help anchor how the government categorizes individuals as “guilty
until proven innocent,” the discussion below demonstrates how some
nonclassified big data programs operated by the government can assign
heightened suspicion through data matches or mismatches in the No
Work List, No Vote List, and No Citizenship List.
205. See, e.g., Electronic Employment Verification Systems: Needed Safeguards to Protect
Privacy and Prevent Misuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship,
Refugees, Border Sec., & Int’l Law of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008) (“In
almost every case, a mismatch will occur either because the employee is actually not authorized
to work . . . ; because the employee has not yet updated his or her records with SSA . . . ; or
because the employer made an error inputting information into the system.”); see also Senate Bill
Implementing Help America Vote Act (HAVA) Would Disenfranchise Thousands of New Yorkers,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW (Mar. 21, 2005),
http://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/senate-bill-implementing-help-america-vote-acthava-would-disenfranchise-thousands-new (describing how SSN mismatches under HAVA
database screening can disenfranchise voters).
206. U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., Privacy
Impact Assessment for the Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements Program (Apr. 19,
2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy/PIAs/privacy-pia-%20uscis-save20130419.pdf (“If SAVE is unable to find a record pertaining to the applicant or the record has
discrepant information or a photo mismatch . . . agencies are required to verbally notify the benefit
applicant that they cannot verify the applicant’s eligibility [and] that there is an additional manual
verification option.”).
207. See, e.g., Secure Communities, U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (explaining that if ICE detects a match through the
screening process, “ICE then reviews other databases to determine whether the person is here
illegally or is otherwise removable”); “False Match” Shows No-Fly List Isn’t Perfect, CBS NEWS
(May 6, 2010, 2:58 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-6466411.html.
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1. No Work List
E-Verify, unlike the No Fly List, has not faced rigorous due process
challenge.208 Yet, multiple programmatic challenges have plagued EVerify since its inception, including allegations that it imposes significant
barriers to employment opportunities without proper redress
opportunities. Many of the difficulties documented by those examining
the E-Verify system show why and how big data database screening
programs are problematic.209 A fundamental issue begins with
questioning the underlying databases and the reliability of the data that
informs the database screening protocol.
In a 1997 report and a 2002 follow-up report, the Inspector General of
the DOJ concluded that the underlying data supporting the E-Verify
system provided by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),
the predecessor of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS), was “flawed in content and accuracy.”210 Despite technological
attempts to upgrade the system over the past decade, such as requiring
employers to double-check the data they have inputted and directly
linking the E-Verify system to USCIS databases, multiple challenges
remain with the system.211 A 2007 evaluation of E-Verify conducted by
Westat, an independent research organization contracted by DHS,
concluded that the accuracy of E-Verify had improved substantially from
its initiation but that the error rate was still too high to allow for the
mandatory expansion of the pilot program.212 The report specifically
determined that “the database used for verification is still not sufficiently
208. Employers, however, have raised some due process challenges to parts of E-Verify;
none have been successful. See KEVIN R. JOHNSON ET AL., UNDERSTANDING IMMIGRATION LAW
137–38 (2012).
209. See, e.g., Stumpf, Getting to Work, supra note 16; 2009 WESTAT REPORT, infra note
227.
210. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. I-2003-001, INSPECTIONS
REPORT: IMMIGRATION. AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE’S ABILITY TO PROVIDE TIMELY AND
ACCURATE ALIEN INFORMATION TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 25 (2002), available
at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/INS/e0301/final.pdf. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REP. NO. I-97-08, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
MONITORING OF NONIMMIGRANT OVERSTAYS (1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/rep
orts/INS/e9708/index.htm; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., FOLLOW-UP
REPORT ON INS EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE CONTROL OF NONIMMIGRANT OVERSTAYS, REP. NO. I2002-006 (2002), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/INS/e0206/index.htm.
211. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-146, EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION:
FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN STEPS TO IMPROVE E-VERIFY, BUT SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES
REMAIN (2010) [hereinafter GAO, 2010 E-VERIFY REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/
assets/320/314278.pdf.
212. WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE WEB BASIC PILOT EVALUATION xxi (2007) [hereinafter 2007
WESTAT REPORT], available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/article/WebBasicPilot
RprtSept2007.pdf (report submitted to DHS).
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up to date to meet the IIRIRA requirement for accurate verification”213
Discrepancies in the underlying databases, human error in inputting
data and accessing the system, and other administrative and technological
complications have resulted from the aggregation and maintenance of the
E-Verify database screening system.214 For example, a 2006 analysis
conducted by SSA of its own databases revealed that an estimated 17.8
million records, or 4.1% contained discrepancies related to name, date of
birth, or citizenship status and that 12.7 million of these pertained to U.S.
citizens.215 A U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
investigation later determined that between one and four percent of lawful
immigrants’ “A” files (alien number and record), the primary record for
all immigrants in the United States, were missing.216 The rate of error was
considerably higher in regions of the nation with the most active filings,
such as the San Diego field office, where nearly 21% of all records were
missing.217
Other records accessed by the E-Verify system are still in analog form.
The paper-based files maintained by DHS and other federal agencies are
in a conversion process to allow for the development of electronic
formats.218 Yet, the process of converting data from an analog, paperbased form to a digital, machine-searchable form leaves room for
additional human error.219
Furthermore, misspellings and incorrect name order lead to data
mismatches under the E-Verify database screening system despite the
fact that SSA algorithms allow for some variation in name order and that
there is a manual check that comes with contesting a TNC.220 This
particular problem disproportionately affects women, because of name
changes due to marriage or divorce, and minorities because foreign
213. Id.
214. DORIS MEISSNER & MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., THE NEXT
GENERATION OF E-VERIFY GETTING EMPLOYMENT VERIFICATION RIGHT 6 (2009), available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Verification_paper-071709.pdf.
215. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., A-08-06-26100, CONGRESSIONAL
RESPONSE REPORT: ACCURACY OF THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION’S NUMIDENT FILE, ii, 6
(2006), available at http://oig.ssa.gov/sites/default/files/audit/full/pdf/A-08-06-26100_0.pdf.
216. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-85, IMMIGRATION BENEFITS:
ADDITIONAL EFFORTS NEEDED TO HELP ENSURE ALIEN FILES ARE LOCATED WHEN NEEDED 3–4
(2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/252947.pdf.
217. Id. at 4.
218. See, e.g., RAPID I-9: Streamlined Electronic I-9 & E-Verify, A-CHECK (Mar. 2010), http://
www.acheckamerica.com/media/1638/2012-004_RAPID_I-9-Electronic_I-9_and_E-Verify.pdf.
219. MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 214, at 6.
220. Name-order errors were also a problem during the 2004 and 2008 U.S. elections when
the government denied many Asian Americans voting rights as a result. See, e.g., ASIAN AM.
LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, ASIAN AMERICAN ACCESS TO DEMOCRACY IN THE 2008 ELECTIONS 4,
9 (2009), available at http://aaldef.org/docs/AALDEF_Election_2008_Report.pdf.
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names are more often transposed.221 Moreover, the databases linked to EVerify must constantly be updated as persons change their names, or as
the immigration or citizenship status of an individual is corrected.222 The
E-Verify system has faced challenges in staying current with the
adaptations to the government databases as they unfold on a minute-byminute basis.223
Experts have concluded that these factors together create a database
screening system that is unreliable and inaccurate in its structure, both
technologically and programmatically, as well a system that has led to
widespread discriminatory results in its application. In the 2007 Westat
report, while E-Verify confirmed U.S. citizens automatically 96% of the
time, the rate dropped to 72% for lawful permanent residents and only
63% for other lawful immigrants authorized to work in the United
States.224 Overall, the proportion of inquiries that produce TNCs has
decreased to almost 2.6% from the 8% that existed from 2004 to 2007.225
The percentage of these TNCs that are erroneous, however, “remains
alarmingly high.”226 According to one estimate, the government issues
22% of all TNCs to lawful workers,227 while another study places the
number at a shocking 95% erroneous TNC rate.228 Of the TNCs that the
government erroneously issues and that individuals later contest and
resolve, error rates are approximately 0.1% for native-born U.S. citizens,
1% for lawful permanent residents, 3.2% for foreign-born citizens, and
5.3% for legal non-immigrants, such as temporary workers and other
noncitizens who are authorized to work.229 This means that the erroneous
mismatch rate is thirty times higher for foreign-born workers than for
those born in the United States and ninety-eight times higher for
naturalized citizens than native-born citizens.230
According to various reports, the average time from the date on which
a worker originally receives a TNC to the resolution of an E-Verify

221. See MEISSNER & ROSENBLUM, supra note 214, at 6.
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. 2007 WESTAT REPORT, supra note 212, at 148.
225. GAO, 2010 E-VERIFY REPORT, supra note 211, at 16.
226. MARC R. ROSENBLUM, MIGRATION POLICY INST., E-VERIFY: STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES,
AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 7 (2011), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/EVerify-Insight.pdf.
227. Id. at 7; see also WESTAT, FINDINGS OF THE E-VERIFY PROGRAM EVALUATION (2009)
[hereinafter 2009 WESTAT REPORT], available at www.uscis.gov/USCIS/E-Verify/EVerify/Final%20E-Verify%20Report%2012-16-09_2.pdf (report submitted to DHS).
228. ROSENBLUM, supra note 226, at 7.
229. 2009 WESTAT REPORT, supra note 227, at 208–11.
230. See 2007 WESTAT REPORT, supra note 212, at xxv–vi.

2015]

BIG DATA BLACKLISTING

1781

dispute can range from 12.5231 to 39.7 days.232 If the matter cannot be
resolved, the federal government has the discretion to issue a “Case in
Continuance” within the E-Verify system.233 While the government
attempts to resolve the data mismatch with the employee, the employee
is often not allowed to work with an intended employer.234 The fact that
many Americans lack the personal documentation necessary to correct an
error exacerbates difficulties in resolving data mismatches under the EVerify system. A 2006 study by the Brennan Center for Justice estimated
that 21 million U.S. citizens lack valid identity documents.235 For
example, 13 million U.S. citizens do not have access to passports, birth
certificates, or naturalization papers needed to prove citizenship (and, in
this case, work authorization).236
Studies have indicated that many employees, particularly those who
are economically disadvantaged, become discouraged and fail to resolve
the mismatch, or employers discourage them from contesting the TNC
result in the E-Verify system.237 Some employers secretly prescreen
employees through the E-Verify system and fail to notify an employee
that she has a right to resolve the system error.238 Eighty-five percent of
all TNCs are uncontested.239
DHS argues that it monitors E-Verify use by “closely monitor[ing]
uncontested mismatches and actively reach[ing] out to employers to
ensure that they are aware of their responsibility to inform employees of
the right to contest.”240 However, Westat and other experts studying the
E-Verify system have questioned whether this monitoring of the system
is sufficient, particularly given the evidence that suggests that the EVerify pilot program is subject to employer misuse and abuse. Numerous
studies have reported finding that “employers do not always follow
Federally mandated safeguards,” that “not all employers inform their
employees of verification problems,” and that lawful workers are
231. 2009 WESTAT REPORT, supra note 227, at 91.
232. 2007 WESTAT REPORT, supra note 212, at E-4.
233. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., E-VERIFY QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR
EMPLOYERS 16 (2010), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/E-Verify/
Customer%20Support/E-Verify%20Quick%20Reference%20Guide%20for%20Employers%20R3%
200-%20Final.pdf.
234. GAO, 2010 E-VERIFY REPORT, supra note 211.
235. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CITIZENS WITHOUT PROOF: A SURVEY OF AMERICANS’
POSSESSION OF DOCUMENTARY PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP AND PHOTO IDENTIFICATION 3 (2006),
available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/d/download_file_39242.pdf.
236. Id. at 2.
237. See id. at 1, 3.
238. See 2007 WESTAT REPORT, supra note 212, at 46.
239. Id. at 49.
240. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., E-VERIFY
STATISTICS, available at http://www.uscis.gov/site-hierarchy/13298/e-verify-program-statistics.
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consequently “denied not only jobs, but also the opportunity to resolve
any inaccuracies in their Federal records.”241
A high percentage of employers failed to inform workers that EVerify produced a TNC in connection with their name. This resulted not
only in a deprivation of an opportunity to correct a false mismatch in the
E-Verify database system, but also led to the deprivation of an
employment opportunity. An early study of the program revealed that
73% of workers whom employers should have notified of a TNC were
not notified, resulting in E-Verify producing a FNC.242 In a more recent
study of E-Verify, 98% of employers reported always notifying workers
of TNCs, but only 58% of individuals who were the subject of TNCs
recalled employers notifying them, and only 28% of their employee files
contained signed copies of the notification form.243 Similarly, while 76%
of employers claimed to always explain the meaning of a TNC to
individuals receiving them, 54% of workers who had received TNCs did
not recall receiving an explanation.244
As a result, violations of the E-Verify system functionally become
invisible and uncontestable due to the virtual nature of the database
screening process. Workers, including U.S. citizens and other lawful
immigrants, are unable to challenge erroneous government records or
potentially inaccurate data screening protocols due to database
prescreening that employers conduct in secret. The programmatic
challenges that have accompanied the E-Verify pilot system thus far
“illustrate[] the fundamental problem with E-Verify: workers are
presumed unauthorized for employment unless they prove otherwise.”245
DHS has attempted to take corrective action.246 USCIS launched the
Compliance Tracking and Management System in 2009 to monitor the
241. INST. FOR SURVEY RESEARCH, TEMPLE UNIV. & WESTAT, INS BASIC PILOT EVALUATION
SUMMARY REPORT 19–20 (2002), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20111018173337/
http://www.nilc.org/immsemplymnt/ircaempverif/basicpiloteval_westat&temple.pdf [hereinafter
BASIC PILOT REPORT].
242. Id. at 20.
243. See 2009 WESTAT REPORT, supra note 227, at 104, 153–56.
244. Id. at 153–54.
245. E-Verify System: DHS Changes Name, but Problems Remain for U.S. Workers, ELEC.
PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (July 2007), http://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0707/.
246. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
E-VERIFY, Employee Email Notifications, http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/employees/employeeemail-notifications. DHS has attempted to correct notice deficiencies related to the E-Verify
program through the introduction of an email notification program. Id. Employers entering
personally identifiable data into the E-Verify database screening protocol must include an email
address if an employee provides one to the employer:
This latest enhancement to E-Verify is made possible by the new Employment
Eligibility Verification Form I-9. Employees will notice a new optional data field

2015]

BIG DATA BLACKLISTING

1783

compliance of employers enrolled in the program.247 Additionally, on
March 21, 2011, USCIS introduced E-Verify Self Check, which allows a
prospective employee to go online to correct data errors.248 If
employment authorization cannot be confirmed, individuals receive
information on how to resolve potential data mismatches.249 Because Self
Check is untested, its remedial impact on the E-Verify system is
unknown. Self Check may in fact open the E-Verify system to other data
vulnerabilities and programmatic challenges.
From empirical studies evaluating the efficacy of E-Verify, it appears
that employers may have denied up to 189,000 U.S. citizens and other
authorized workers employment opportunities under the database
screening program.250 Appendix A provides an example of some of the
consequences faced by individuals alleging employment deprivations by
the government as a result of the program.
2. No Vote List
To vote, a person’s name must appear on the voter registration roll
maintained by the county in which he votes.251 States will occasionally
purge names from their voter rolls, ostensibly to ensure that only those
eligible to vote can do so.252 A report from thirty-nine states and the
District of Columbia, for example, stated that local governments purged

in Section 1 of the revised Form I-9 asking for the employee’s email address;
this update allows employees to voluntarily provide their email address. When
the employee provides an email address on Form I-9, employers must enter it
into E-Verify. The new email notification process does not replace the current
TNC process. Employers are still required to notify employees of TNCs and their
right to contest.
Id.
247. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., E-VERIFY:
HISTORY AND MILESTONES 4 (2014), available at http://www.uscis.gov/e-verify/aboutprogram/history-and-milestones.
248. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., DHS LAUNCHES
E-VERIFY SELF CHECK FACT SHEET (2011), available at http://www.uscis.gov/news/dhs-launches-everify-self-check-fact-sheet.
249. Id.
250. GAO, 2010 E-VERIFY REPORT, supra note 211, at 16. In fiscal year 2009, “about
189,000 [new hires], received a [Final Nonconfirmation under E-Verify] because their
employment eligibility status remained unresolved.” Id.
251. MYRNA PÉREZ, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, VOTER PURGES 1 (2008), available at
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/publications/Voter.Purges.f.pdf.
252. See, e.g., Zachary Roth, Ken Cuccinelli’s Voter Purge in Virginia, MSNBC (Oct. 18,
2013, 2:21 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/ken-cuccinellis-voter-purge.
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13 million people from voter rolls from 2004 to 2006.253
Thus, it is important to look at examples of states that have attempted
to purge their voter rolls and examine concrete examples of eligible
voters who found themselves removed from a local voter roll due to
database error or human error. The HAVA database screening system,
relying upon SSA’s database, and the SAVE database screening protocol,
relying upon the immigration records databases of DHS, have been
criticized as being particularly unreliable for voter purges.254 Appendix
B gives details on the challenges and consequences that can accompany
voter purges through database screening.
3. No Citizenship List
Since its inception in 2008, as explained above, S-COMM/PEP has
facilitated state and local law enforcement data sharing with the FBI and
DHS, including data sharing through biometric database screening (e.g.,
digital fingerprints).255 S-COMM has been criticized for targeting noncriminal offenders and for other inefficacies.256 The database, for
example, has been criticized as outdated and error-prone and the database
screening protocol appears to facilitate the unlawful detention and
deportation of U.S. citizens over whom the ICE has no authority.257
253. PÉREZ, supra note 251, at 1 (citing U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, THE IMPACT
NATIONAL VOTER REGISTRATION ACT OF 1993 ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF ELECTIONS FOR
FEDERAL OFFICE 2005–2006: A REPORT TO THE 110TH CONGRESS 50 (2007), available at http://www.
eac.gov/assets/1/Page/NVRA%20Reports%20and%20Data%20Sets%202006-2005.pdf).
254. See, e.g., id. at 22.
255. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECOND
CONGRESSIONAL STATUS REPORT COVERING THE FOURTH QUARTER FISCAL YEAR 2008 FOR
SECURE COMMUNITIES: A COMPREHENSIVE P LAN TO IDENTIFY AND REMOVE CRIMINAL ALIENS 8–
10 (2008) ( “The Interoperability pilot, also known as interim Data Service Model (iDSM), was
launched in September 2006. . . . [And] “ICE plan[ned] to move Interoperability to full production
at the first pilot site in October 2008.”), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/secure_
communities/congressionalstatusreportfy084thquarter.pdf.
256. See, e.g., MOTOMURA, supra note 20, at 83 (S-COMM “exposes unauthorized migrants
with no criminal record or only minor convictions to deportation[,]” and in addition, “undermines
the relationship between police and immigrant communities”); Cox & Miles, Policing
Immigration, supra note 20, at 134 (explaining that results from empirical evaluation “reveal a
disparate impact, but cannot identify disparate treatment—the intentional singling out of a racial
or ethnic group”); Lasch, supra note 20, at 225 (“[T]here has been a general failure of Secure
Communities to hit its target. . . . some seventy-nine percent of immigrants deported through
Secure Communities had either no criminal conviction or only a lower level criminal conviction.”)
(citations omitted).
257. See, e.g., KOHLI ET AL., supra note 169, at 4 (“ICE acknowledges that there might be
[Automated Biometric Identification System] matches, or hits, for U.S. citizens for a number of
reasons, including that naturalization data has not been updated in its databases.” (citing Secure
Communities: IDENT/IAFIS Interoperability Monthly Statistics through April 20, 2011, at 50,
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, retrieved from http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/
OF THE
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According to one report, as of April 2011, ICE may have erroneously
apprehended approximately 3600 U.S. citizens through the use of the SCOMM biometric database screening protocol.258 These mistakes may
result when faulty information finds its way into the S-COMM database
screening protocol, and when the database information comes from many
sources.259
The U.S. government often denies error in the detention and
deportation of U.S. citizens. One study has concluded that ICE has not
detained or deported any U.S. citizens.260 Yet, “[a]ccording to ICE
records, [from Fiscal Year 2008 to Fiscal Year 2012, immigration]
detainers were issued on a total of 834 individuals who were actually U.S.
citizens.”261 Additionally, under S-COMM, through erroneous database
screening results, it appears that S-COMM mistakenly targeted up to
5880 U.S. citizens for potential detention and deportation.262 Although it
appears that ICE identified the database screening errors prior to the
erroneous detention and deportation of the 5880 U.S. citizens, the fact
remains that the S-COMM database screening protocols may have
wrongfully targeted thousands of U.S. citizens. This potentially indicates
programmatic challenges such as inaccurate algorithms, unreliable data
in the underlying databases, inaccurate biometric data captured or entered
into the database possibly from human error, other implementation
failures, or other technological or program management difficulties.
Given the continued debate on this topic, it is important to look at
news accounts of those who ICE has unlawfully detained because of
database error. Appendix C contains examples of U.S. citizens who ICE
sc-stats/nationwide_interoperability_stats-fy2011-feb28.pdf)); CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS, NAT’L DAY LABORER ORG. NETWORK, & CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW IMMIGRATION JUSTICE
CLINIC, Briefing Guide to Secure Communities 3 (2010), available at http://ccrjustice.org/sites/
default/files/assets/files/Secure%20Communities%20Fact%20Sheet%20Briefing%20guide%20
8-2-2010%20Production.pdf.
258. KOHLI ET AL., supra note 169, at 4 (“[W]e find that approximately 3,600 US citizens
have been apprehended by ICE from the inception of the program through April 2011[,]”
extrapolating from 1.6% of cases where U.S. citizens were apprehended by ICE in study of “a
random national sample of 375 individuals who were identified as ‘IDENT-Matches’ by the
Secure Communities Program”).
259. See id. 1–2 (explaining that the S-COMM database screening protocol includes
forwarding information to the FBI and DHS, and “DHS checks the fingerprints against the
Automated Biometric Identification System, also known as IDENT, a fingerprint repository
containing information on over 91 million individuals, including travelers, applicants for
immigration benefits, and immigrants who have previously violated immigration laws”).
260. See W.D. Reasoner & Jessica Vaughan, Secure Communities by the Numbers, Revisited
(Part 1 of 3): Analyzing the Analysis, CTR. FOR IMMIG. STUD. (Dec. 2011), http://cis.org/SC-bythe-numbers-critique-part1.
261. TRAC IMMIGRATION, WHO ARE THE TARGETS OF ICE DETAINERS? (2013), available at
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/310/.
262. See Julia Preston, U.S. Identifies 111,000 Immigrants with Criminal Records, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/13/us/13ice.html.
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erroneously and unlawfully detained, including U.S. citizens subjected to
erroneous deportation.
B. Risks of Classified and Semi-Classified Big Data Programs
At the dawn of the big data revolution, as explained above,
unprecedented governmental access to public and private data led to an
unprecedented asymmetric power between the state and citizen. As can
be better understood through a careful examination of big data programs
that may be informed by classified and semi-classified information
gathering systems, the power asymmetries are especially pronounced
when national security objectives heighten governmental power while the
administrative state objectives may weaken the position of the citizen in
relationship to the government.
Big data technologies facilitate the government’s ability to search for
suspicious data. Therefore, newly emerging big data programs allow for
the tracking and isolation of digitally generated data deemed
“suspicious,”
including “suspicious” metadata, “suspicious”
associational and geolocational data, “suspicious” correlative data and
data patterns, and other mass integrative record data and algorithmic
matching data that can be construed as “suspicious.” One of the key risks,
therefore, is an inability to remediate one’s “guilty until proven innocent”
status. Overcoming the inferential guilt facilitated by big data tools may
be nearly impossible due to the classified and semi-classified position of
the data that has singled out individuals for suspicion. Algorithmic
intelligence systems structured to support big data programs, and
defended as statistically accurate, may be nearly impossible to challenge
as well.
1. Terrorist Watchlist
Due to the classified nature of the intelligence that informs the
fulfillment of the unclassified criteria for placement on a terrorist
watchlist, an individual’s ability to understand and challenge their
inclusion on a watchlist is limited.263 “The lesser standard for inclusion
in the broader TSDB . . . requires a reasonable suspicion that the
individual is a known or suspected terrorist.”264 The criteria for inclusion
263. See, e.g., Defendants’ Consolidated Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and Opposition at 52, Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-CV-00750-BR (D.
Or. May 28, 2015) (stating that when faced with the reasons for a nomination to the No Fly List,
the United States has argued “such inquiries would inevitably seek to scrutinize reasons for the
No Fly determination and support for them—the vast majority of which would implicate classified
national security and law enforcement information”).
264. Id. at 5 n.3 (citing Declaration of TSC Deputy Director for Operations G. Clayton Grigg,
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on the No Fly List require a higher standard. Specifically, the United
States has explained that “any individual, regardless of citizenship, may
be placed on the No Fly List if the TSC determines that he or she
represents: a threat of committing an act of international terrorism . . . or
an act of domestic terrorism.”265
According to a public report issued by the DOJ’s Office of the
Inspector General, names “enter the master TSDB through a so-called
‘nomination process.’”266 Staff from the FBI and TSC assess levels of
terrorist-related suspicion based upon “‘whether or not the person is an
appropriate candidate for inclusion’ on the consolidated watch list and
‘whether or not sufficient identifying information is available.’”267 The
nomination and determination process has been criticized for its failure
to rigorously and individually assess appropriate inclusion. It has also
been criticized for a lack of any minimum qualitative guideline or
quantitative baseline for investigatory or evidentiary standards.268
“[T]he U.S. Government’s consolidated Terrorist Screening Database
(TSDB) [is] often referred to as the ‘Terrorist Watchlist,’ and serves as a
bridge between law enforcement, Homeland Security, the Intelligence
May 28, 2015 (Grigg Decl.) ¶ 15).
265. Id. (citing See Gen. Stipulations [Dkt. No. 173] ¶ 5; Declaration of TSC Deputy Director
for Operations G. Clayton Grigg, May 28, 2015 (Grigg Decl.) ¶ 17.3). The specific criteria for
inclusion on the No Fly List includes:
[1] a threat of committing an act of international terrorism (as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 2331(1))[;]
[2] or [a threat of committing] an act of domestic terrorism (as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 2331(5)) with respect to an aircraft (including a threat of air piracy, or
threat to an airline, passenger, or civil aviation security);
[3] or a threat of committing an act of domestic terrorism (as defined in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331(5)) with respect to the homeland;
[4] or a threat of committing an act of international terrorism (as defined in 18
U.S.C. § 2331(1)) against any U.S. Government facility abroad and associated
or supporting personnel, including U.S. embassies, consulates and missions,
military installations (as defined by 10 U.S.C. § 2801(c)(4)), U.S. ships, U.S.
aircraft, or other auxiliary craft owned or leased by the U.S. Government;
[5] or a threat of engaging in or conducting a violent act of terrorism and who is
operationally capable of doing so.
Id.
266. Shane, supra note 10, at 815–16 (citing AUDIT DIV., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Audit Rep. 05-27, Review of the Terrorist Screening Center 41–43 (2005)
(redacted for public release), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/FBI/a0527/final.pdf).
267. Id. at 816 (citation omitted).
268. See, e.g., id. at 816–17.

1788

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

Community, and international partners.”269 Because the TSC databases
and Terrorist Watchlist contain classified information, it is difficult to
confirm or interrogate the protocols, methodologies, and other systems in
which the government compiles, maintains, analyzes, and utilizes the
digital watchlists for policy making.
2. No Fly List
Currently, the FBI, through the TSC, develops and maintains the No
Fly List, which consists of the names of individuals whom airlines
serving or flying within the United States may not transport.270 The No
Fly List is a subset of the TSDB, and DHS defines it as “a list of
individuals who are prohibited from boarding an aircraft.”271 In other
words, the government prohibits most individuals on the list from flying
into, out of, or over Canadian and American airspace.272 The Selectee
List, another subset of the TSDB, is “a list of individuals who must
undergo additional security screening before being permitted to board an
aircraft.”273
In recent years, litigation has forced the disclosure of information on
what specific data ultimately supports a decision to place an individual
on the No Fly List. Scholars have noted concerns associated with a
combination of public–private intelligence-gathering partnerships that
focus on data capture and data analytics.274 In particular, criticism has
been leveled that these public–private data partnerships “have enabled the
Executive to operate outside of the congressionally imposed framework
of court orders and subpoenas, and also outside of the ambit of interbranch oversight.”275 Regarding due process safeguards and other
constitutional concerns, some suggest that the private data gathering
conducted by TSC potentially surpasses ex ante constitutional
protections, while also removing any remaining ex post facto
protections.276
269. About the Terrorist Screening Center, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, available at https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/nsb/tsc/about-the-terrorist-screening-center.
270. Tarhuni v. Holder, 8 F. Supp. 3d 1253, 1262 (D. Or. 2014).
271. Mohamed, supra note 193 (quoting the declaration of Christopher M. Piehota,
appointed director of the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) on April 10, 2013) (Piehota Decl.,
¶ 16).
272. Id.
273. Id. (Piehota Decl., ¶ 16).
274. See generally O’HARROW, supra note 31; PRIEST & ARKIN, supra note 31; Jon D.
Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private–Public Intelligence Partnerships in the War on
Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901 (2008).
275. See id. at 904.
276. See id. (stating that these agreements “leave Congress and the courts ill-equipped . . . to
intervene to remedy individual instances or patterns of injustice”).
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Although TSC is the final arbiter on whether an individual remains in
the TSC database, TSC does not accept redress inquiries.277 Rather, an
individual petitioning to have their name removed from either the No Fly
List or Selectee List must submit a form to DHS Traveler Inquiry Redress
Program (DHS TRIP).278 DHS TRIP then communicates the inquiry to
TSC, which makes a decision on the redress request without providing
any further information.279 TSC notifies DHS TRIP of the decision, and
DHS TRIP, in turn, contacts the petitioner.280 Until recently, despite a
decision on the status of the No Fly List petitioner, DHS TRIP’s final
communication with the petitioner “neither confirms nor denies the
existence of any terrorist watch list records relating to the individual” and
further does not state whether the individual may fly in the future.281 In
effect, individuals previously had no way to confirm their placement on
the No Fly List unless they were denied entry onto a commercial airplane.
The No Fly List litigation forced a revision of the prior notice and
redress procedures after it was found to be procedurally defective under
procedural due process.282 These revised redress procedures for the No
277. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-1031, TERRORIST WATCH LIST
SCREENING: EFFORTS TO HELP REDUCE ADVERSE EFFECTS ON THE PUBLIC 31 (2006) [hereinafter
GAO, TERRORIST WATCH LIST SCREENING], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/260/251875.
pdf; see also TSC Redress Procedures, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/nsb/tsc/tsc_redress (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
278. See 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(G)(i) (2012) (requiring the TSA to “establish a timely and
fair process for individuals identified as a threat under [the screening system] to appeal to the
[TSA] the determination and correct any erroneous information”); id. § 44926(a) (“The Secretary
of Homeland Security shall establish a timely and fair process for individuals who believe they
have been delayed or prohibited from boarding a commercial aircraft because they were wrongly
identified as a threat under the regimes utilized by the [TSA].”).
279. See LIZZY GARY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE DHS TRAVELER
REDRESS INQUIRY PROGRAM (DHS TRIP) 2 (2013), available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/privacy-pia-update-dhs-all-dhstrip-20130605.pdf.
280. Id. at 4.
281. GAO, TERRORIST WATCH LIST SCREENING, supra note 277, at 31. For example, the letter
addressed to one of the plaintiffs in Latif v. Holder stated:
Security procedures and legal concerns mandate that we can neither confirm nor
deny any information about you which may be within federal watchlists or reveal
any law enforcement sensitive information. However, we have made any
corrections to records that our inquiries determined were necessary, including,
as appropriate, notations that may assist in avoiding instances of
misidentification.
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss at 3 n.1, Latif v. Holder, No. 10-CV-750-BR, 2011 WL 1667471 (D. Or. May
3, 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
282. See Defendants’ Consolidated Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment and Opposition at 273, Latif v. Holder,No. 3:10-cv-00750-BR (D. Or. May
28, 2015).
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Fly List became available to the public in March 2015.283
Under the new redress procedures, individuals trying to challenge
their inclusion on the No Fly List may receive “notice” of their
inclusion.284 The redress procedures, thus, may not provide individuals
with any summary of information at all in some circumstances.285
Further, “[b]ecause No Fly List determinations are typically based on
sensitive and classified information, this summary necessarily may not
reflect the complete factual basis for inclusion.”286 The redress
procedures, thus, may provide individuals with an incomplete summary
of information in other circumstances.287 The new redress procedures do
not include procedurally guaranteed access to the underlying evidence
that may have led to one’s nomination to the No Fly List (e.g., collected
data, witness statements, and reports).288 The new redress procedures
further do not include live adversarial proceedings that provide a
challenger an opportunity to confront witnesses, interrogate the scientific
validity of the methods that led to deprivation, or analyze or dispute the
evidence compiled against the individual.289
The revised redress procedures do not appear to provide a method to
determine whether an individual is on the Selectee List.290 However, the
possibility of an internal administrative appeal or judicial review in a U.S.
Court of Appeals exists under 49 U.S.C. § 46110.291 Travelers may also
attempt to preemptively determine their status by opting in to the TSA’s
Pre-Check system,292 which expedites screening (and ostensibly

283. Id.
284. Id. (citing Notice Regarding Revisions to DHS TRIP Procedures [Dkt. No. 197];
Declaration of Deborah O. Moore, Branch Manager of the Transportation Security Redress
Branch in the Office of Civil Rights & Civil Liberties, Ombudsman and Traveler Engagement at
TSA, May 28, 2015 (Moore Decl.) ¶¶ 12–13).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 34 (citing Dkt. No. 173 ¶¶ 17–18; Grigg Decl. ¶ 46; Moore Decl. ¶¶ 18–19).
287. Id.
288. Id. at 39 (stating that according to the United States, “Plaintiffs should not be granted
the right to crossexamine individuals, let alone any sources of intelligence or investigative
information provided to the Government, in this national security context”).
289. Id. at 40 (stating that according to the United States, “the specific circumstances
strongly weigh against a live adversarial hearing to contest No Fly determinations”).
290. DHS explains that “[t]he U.S. government does not reveal whether a particular person
is on or not on a watchlist.” U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TRANSP. SEC., TRAVELER REDRESS
INQUIRY PROGRAM, Step 1: Should I Use DHS TRIP?, http://www.dhs.gov/step-1-should-i-usedhs-trip.
291. Latif v. Holder, 686 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2012).
292. See TSA Pre Check, TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/tsa-pre-check (last
visited Oct. 16, 2015).
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boarding) by pre-checking credentials against the terrorist database.293
The DHS Privacy Office noted in a 2006 report that the existing redress
procedures and mechanisms varied in both procedure and effectiveness
across the many agencies involved in the watchlists and recommended a
robust centralized screening procedure.294 From the published redress
procedures, DHS appears to focus redress relating to persons
misidentified as being included on a watchlist.295
A 2007 DOJ report estimated that the No Fly List contained over
700,000 names and further reported that the list was “increas[ing] by an
average of more than 20,000 records each month.”296 A 2012 GAO report
noted an increase in individuals denied boarding or selected for
screening, but it did not report any data on the specific volume of the
current list.297 At the time, the FBI reported approximately 550,000
names on the No Fly List, including 500 U.S. citizens.298
The TSC offers an internal auditing process that periodically
determines the appropriateness of an individual’s inclusion on the list.
For instance, the government removed almost 3700 names between July
and October of 2004.299 However, despite the remedial procedure and
internal auditing process, the list has continued to misidentify individuals
and produce both false positives and false negatives. For example,
individuals denied access to a commercial flight or repeatedly detained
include a U.S. Marine returning from Iraq,300 a U.S. Senator,301 and a U.S.
House Representative.302 A 2004 audit of the TSC by the DOJ found
multiple deficiencies in the watchlist databases—errors of both
293. It remains an open question whether a “pre-checked” passenger could still run afoul of
a watchlist by virtue of a database error.
294. MAUREEN COONEY, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY OFFICE, REPORT ON EFFECTS
ON PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 16–21 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/
privacy/privacy_rpt_nofly.pdf.
295. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., TRANSP. SEC., TRAVELER REDRESS INQUIRY
PROGRAM, supra note 290 (“[I]f you have been selected for secondary screening on multiple
occasions you might be able to use DHS TRIP to resolve issues such as misidentification.”).
296. Justice Department Report Tells of Flaws in Terrorist Watch List, CNN (Sept. 6, 2007),
http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/06/terror.watchlist/.
297. See Andrea Stone, No-Fly List Maintained by FBI Includes Double the U.S. Citizens
Since 2009, HUFFINGTON POST (June 1, 2012, 3:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/06/01/no-fly-list_n_1563261.html.
298. Id.
299. Shane, supra note 10, at 817.
300. ‘No-Fly’ List Delays Marine's Iraq Homecoming, NBC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2006, 11:06
AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/12284855/#.UW4K_JO86So.
301. Sara Kehaulani Goo, Sen. Kennedy Flagged by No-Fly List, WASH. POST (Aug. 20,
2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A17073-2004Aug19.html.
302. Ted Barrett, Kennedy Has Company on Airline Watch List, CNN (Aug. 20, 2004, 7:18
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/08/20/lewis.watchlist/index.html.
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overinclusion and underinclusion.303 Moreover, a later study showed that
the list contained unreliable data, with 35% of the names on the list
characterized as “outdated.”304
The potential unreliability of these systems has led critics to question
the accuracy of the data-driven programs that have placed an estimated
500 U.S. citizens on the No Fly List,305 5000 U.S. citizens on the Terrorist
Watchlist,306 and 15,800 U.S. citizens on the Terrorist Identities Datamart
Environment (TIDE) database307—the “central repository”308 of known
or suspected international terrorists.309
Appendix D summarizes the circumstances of some of the U.S.
citizens and lawful permanent residents claiming due process harms
resulting from allegedly erroneous placement on the No Fly List.
IV. BIG DATA BLACKLISTING AND THE DUE PROCESS INQUIRY
As explained above, procedural due process is simply the concept
enshrined in the Constitution that when the government deprives a citizen
of an interest in life, liberty, or property, the citizen is given notice and
303. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE TERRORIST
SCREENING CENTER xiv–xv, 48–66 (2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/
reports/FBI/a0527/final.pdf (noting incorrect information in records that would tend to produce
false positives, but also errors resulting in false negatives).
304. See Watch Lists, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/watch-lists (last
visited Oct. 16, 2015).
305. See, e.g., No-Fly List Doubles in a Year—Now 21,000 Names, CBS NEWS (Feb. 2, 2012,
3:01 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/no-fly-list-doubles-in-a-year-now-21000-names/; see
also ACLU Factsheet, available at https://www.aclu.org/national-security/factsheet-acluschallenge-us-governments-no-fly-list.
306. Jeremy Scahill & Ryan Devereaux, Barack Obama’s Secret Terrorist-Tracking System,
By the Numbers, INTERCEPT (Aug. 5, 2014), available at https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2014/08
/05/watch-commander/; see also Terrorist Watchlist, INFO. SHARING ENV’T, http://www.ise.gov/
terrorist-watchlist (“The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) maintains the U.S. government’s
consolidated Terrorist Watchlist[-]which supports the ability of front line screening agencies to
positively identify known or suspected terrorists trying to obtain visas, enter the country, board
aircraft, or engage in other activity.”).
307. Terrorist Watchlist, supra note 306 (“The National Counterterrorism Center manages
the Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE), which serves as the U.S. government’s
central repository of information on international terrorist identities as established by the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. TIDE supports the [U.S.
Government’s] various terrorist screening systems or ‘watchlists’ . . . .”).
308. Id.; see also INFO. SHARING ENV’T, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS (2014), available
at https://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/2014_ISE_Annual_Report_to_Congress_0.pdf.
309. The total number of individuals in TIDE is estimated to be over 740,000 persons, of
which only a small percentage are U.S. citizens. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42336, TERRORIST WATCH LIST SCREENING AND BRADY BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR
FIREARMS 10 (2012), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R42336.pdf (reporting that as
of December 2011, “TIDE contained over 740,000 persons”).
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an opportunity to be heard.310 Substantive due process turns on abstract
liberty concepts, including “individual dignity and autonomy,” “personal
identity,” and other rights that courts may construe as inalienable.311
Substantive due process rights are often viewed as a protection of rights
that are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”312 Rights
that are not “fundamental” or “deeply rooted” are subject to lesser
scrutiny. “All other liberty interests may be abridged or abrogated
pursuant to a validly enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”313
Its origins “lie in natural law concepts that predate the doctrine’s
association with due process,” and it holds “that once particular rights
became vested in individuals, the legislature [is] without power to rescind
those rights.”314 For example, in a recent decision, the Supreme Court
held that, under substantive due process, “same-sex couples may exercise
the right to marry.”315 In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court explained that
“the fundamental liberties protected by this [Due Process] Clause include
most of the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights,”316 and, further, that
historical “principles and traditions . . . demonstrate that the reasons
marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to
same-sex couples.”317 The Court elaborated that “these liberties extend to
certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”318
As Richard Fallon observes, substantive due process consists of “what
310. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35 (1976).
311. See supra note 70 (citing Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015) (“In
addition these liberties extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and
autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal identity and beliefs.”) (citing Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–86 (1965));
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (citation omitted); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 726 (1997) (citation omitted); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
851 (1992) (“These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
312. Glucksberg, 521 at 721 (citation omitted).
313. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593.
314. Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J.
408, 423 (2010) (citations omitted); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Tradition as Past and Present
in Substantive Due Process Analysis, 62 DUKE L.J. 535, 540 (2012); Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale
of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the Idea of Fundamental
Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751 (2009).
315. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599, 2604–05 (2015).
316. Id. at 2597 (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 147–49 (1968)).
317. Id. at 2599.
318. Id. at 2597 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479, 484–86 (1965)).

1794

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

the Supreme Court takes to be widely shared intuitions or principles that
impose duties on government and define standards of reasonableness that
constrain governmental pursuit even of acceptable goals.”319
A. Substantive Due Process and Informational Privacy Rights
The applicability of substantive due process protections as a vehicle
to shield individuals from overreaching and normalized government
dataveillance under newly emerging big data tools remains a complicated
and perhaps wishful potentiality, but one that must be considered. Recent
cases like United States v. Jones320 have raised—but largely avoided
answering—the question of whether and how the Fourth Amendment
might protect individuals from government surveillance in the context of
law enforcement investigation.321 Yet, even if the Fourth Amendment
may eventually be found to have teeth enough to post limits on the
cybersurveillance of law enforcement authorities, it will provide no
assistance to individuals outside the law enforcement context. In the
National Surveillance State, big data cybersurveillance and big data
bureaucratized surveillance systems often operate administratively across
a much broader spectrum than that of law enforcement.322
Resorting to the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in the form of
substantive due process protection of individual privacy in a big data
world remains a speculative but perhaps necessary venture if
constitutional protections are to keep pace with technological leaps and
bounds in the realms of big data cybersurveillance and mass
dataveillance. An informational right of privacy is not exactly
unprecedented, although it is unestablished and stridently opposed by at
least two of the Court’s current Justices. In 2011, in concurring opinions
in NASA v. Nelson,323 Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas
criticized the notion that the Constitution might protect informational

319. Fallon, supra note 67, at 323.
320. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
321. In United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), the majority focused on the
government’s physical trespass affecting property to find that a violation of the Fourth
Amendment had occurred. Two concurring opinions emphasized that the Court’s current Fourth
Amendment tests (one test relies on trespass, the other is the Katz reasonable expectation of
privacy test) will be increasingly inapplicable to technology-based cases in the future.
322. The converse is equally true: Where the Fourth Amendment does apply, a party
generally will not have to resort to the due process clause. “Where a particular Amendment
‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of
government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substantive due
process’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273
(1994) (quoting Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)).
323. NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134 (2011).
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privacy.324 Their position is consistent with their broader opposition to
the notion of substantive due process in the first place—something that,
of course, would vitiate substantive due process as a restraint on big data
blacklisting harms.325
Nevertheless, the Court in Nelson avoided deciding whether a
constitutional right of informational privacy exists. Instead, assuming
that such a right does exist, it held that it was not offended by the
government inquiring into the past history of drug use of private
government contractors and employees.326 Justice Samuel Alito authored
the majority opinion, adopting a restrained approach and potentially
reflecting the Court’s reluctance to recognize or expand a constitutional
right to informational privacy. One could speculate that discarding a right
to informational privacy at the dawn of big data—when the implications
of big data are not fully understood by anyone, let alone the judiciary—
may not have seemed prudent to the Court. In fact, cases like Jones
suggest strongly that the Court may be open to retooling Fourth
Amendment doctrine if its current jurisprudence remains incapable of
applying effective restraints on cybersurveillance and dataveillance by
the government. While Nelson is certainly not a bellwether of a similar
inclination in the context of due process rights, its restraint may indicate
something more than a necessary compromise between Justices of
differing ideological outlooks.327
324. Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence in Nelson: “Our due process precedents, even
our ‘substantive due process’ precedents, do not support any right to informational privacy.” Id.
at 161 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF
DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 152–54 (2013) (explaining that, under the
category of an informational right to privacy, “the Court has ‘referred broadly to a constitutional
privacy ‘interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters’”) (citing Nelson); see also Lior
Stahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 2007, 2011 (2010) (arguing that “the
constitutional right to information privacy . . . ought to much more closely resemble privacy tort
law” and in “constitutional adjudication” the courts should ask three questions: “Whether the
information is private,” “What the applicable social norms are,” and “What social interests are
vindicated by privacy”); Lior Stahilevitz, The Centenarian Who Wasn’t, NASA v. Nelson and the
Constitutional Right to Information Privacy, U. CHI. L. SCH. FAC. BLOG (Sept. 23, 2010, 10:37 AM),
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2010/09/the-centenarian-who-wasn’t-nasa-v-nelson-and-theconstitutional-right-to-information-privacy.html) (discussing the Court’s treatment of the
constitutional right to privacy in Nelson, concluding that the “applicable frameworks for deciding
whether the government’s conduct violates the constitutional right to information privacy are by
no means sensible”).
325. “[T]he very idea of substantive due process has been contested.” ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 571 (5th ed. 2015).
326. “We assume, without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort
mentioned in Whalen and Nixon. We hold, however, that the challenged portions of the
Government’s background check do not violate this right in the present case.” Nelson, 562 U.S.
at 138.
327. Sullivan and Massaro point out that while conservatives may oppose substantive due
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What Nelson did was enable precedent on informational privacy rights
to survive—precedent that Justices Scalia and Thomas thought should be
overruled. The Court identified two cases that have opened the door to
the notion of constitutional protection of informational privacy. One was
Whalen v. Roe,328 a 1977 case that dealt with an early form of big data—
a database storing the identities of persons receiving prescriptions for
drugs that New York authorities deemed to be dangerous.329 Nelson also
preserved as precedent Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.330
That case concerned a statute331 that Congress passed in the wake of
Watergate and Nixon’s resignation that was designed to protect Nixon’s
presidential records and tapes.332 Besides the government’s interest in
collecting the information, the Whalen and Nixon Courts appeared to be
swayed by the fact that the harvest of informational data was the least
intrusive means for the government to pursue its legitimate and
compelling aims. Litigants in the modern context will need to raise the
same query. A case challenging the governmental storage and big data or
metadata screening of personally identifiable information will be all the
stronger if a litigant can suggest an alternative, more restrictive way to
achieve the government end without so broadly violating the privacy of
the citizenry.
Both Whalen and Nixon make clear that raising a substantive due
process claim in the modern context would thus prompt a twofold inquiry
of big data. First, to determine if the government’s accumulation and use
of big data poses a constitutional threat, the Court would have to inquire
into whether there are safeguards to prevent unauthorized informational
access that would violate constitutional informational privacy interests or
other means of unwarranted disclosure. Secondly, the Court would need
to determine whether the statutory and regulatory framework governing
informational privacy has sufficiently kept pace with the technological
innovations enabling the government to collect and use big data.
A strong contention is that a government-led big data program, in and
of itself, constitutes a substantive due process problem when it results in
a “suspicion upon a suspicion” problem (e.g., “suspicion”—digitallyprocess rights, there is also strong element of conservatism that joins with liberalism in a suspicion
of unrestrained governmental powers. “Conservative libertarians, as well as many liberal
progressives, likely regard informational privacy as worthy of constitutional, not merely statutory,
protection and thus may favor a more elastic view of due process than a narrow ‘history and
tradition’-based approach might allow.” SULLIVAN & MASSARO, supra note 324, at 153.
328. 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
329. Id. at 592–93.
330. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
331. Presidential Recordings and Material Preservation Act, Pub. L. No. 93-526, 88 Stat.
1695 (1974).
332. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 431–32.
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generated or big data-generated suspicion that the government or its
delegates may believe is actionable—based “upon a suspicion”—
suspicious digital data or database screening result). Any resort to big
data cybersurveillance or mass dataveillance systems, in the context of
government programs which grant or deny eligibility for rights or
privileges, or programs which may mediate or interfere with freedoms or
liberty interests, may pose a constitutional challenge. On this score, those
programs that subject individuals to big data blacklisting harms would be
subject to strict scrutiny analysis: The government must show that its
reliance on big data is necessary and narrowly tailored to the use it is
serving, and serves a compelling state interest.333 Or, in the alternative,
in the case of the No Fly List, for instance, the government could be
compelled to develop an alternative process: A nomination and appeals
system must involve small data processes and human intelligence that an
individual can fairly contest (e.g., interrogate witnesses, directly
challenge the evidence).
B. Substantive Due Process Approach to Systemic Big Data
Blacklisting Harms
The Court in Whalen initiated a theory of informational privacy rights
and the question of whether substantive due process should encompass
privacy expectations related to the collection and use of digital data,
including database systems. A procedural due process approach may
appear to be the most logical given the framework that courts use to
analyze both substantive and procedural due process deprivations. This
Article, however, contends that digital watchlisting and database
screening systems should be critiqued collectively; thus, the focus of the
constitutional inquiry should be on the protections afforded by
substantive due process. Unlike many other constitutional claims that are
fact-dependent and generally center around individual rights, due process
doctrine generally, and substantive due process in particular, can be
viewed as a systemic-type remedy to address system-wide harms.334
Additionally, procedural due process assumes that mediation of a right
was itself proper, whereas substantive due process interrogates the
propriety of the mediation of a fundamental right in the first instance.335
333. See, e.g., Daskal, supra note 33, at 377 (“A searching inquiry into the No Fly List, for
example, reveals the way it burdens, albeit without extinguishing, long-recognized interests in
interstate travel, association, and pursuit of employment of one's choosing. . . . Ultimately, the
courts should be pushing the Executive toward a narrow tailoring of restraint to need.”).
334. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 67, at 311 (“[A]lthough we characteristically think of
constitutional rights in individualistic terms, due process doctrine has developed a strikingly
managerial aspect.”).
335. See, e.g., Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of
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Consequently, under procedural due process, the court focuses its inquiry
on the method of mediation (e.g., evidentiary hearing, notice, and an
impartial judge),336 whereas under substantive due process, the court
typically engages a strict scrutiny review to analyze the precise issue
before it (e.g., whether a compelling state purpose supports the
government action).337
Therefore, this Article seeks to explore a more holistic approach, one
that moves beyond critiquing discrete big data programs and instead
stresses the commonalities between these various government programs.
Looking at the harms of these programs collectively may provide the
theoretical vista for conceptualizing how big data blacklisting is, in itself,
a substantive due process violation. This is a complex undertaking, and
future scholarship on this subject will explore the analytical framework
of substantive due process in the context of the mass harms of big data
blacklisting. But for the present, this Article is necessarily more
descriptive—delineating the general contours of big data blacklisting as
a technique of governance and suggesting that procedural due process
may be inadequate to remedy big data blacklisting harms.
CONCLUSION
This Article asks whether procedural and substantive due process
protections, as currently constructed, fail to address big data blacklisting
harms. Big data blacklisting impacts fundamental constitutional rights
when digital data is flagged as “suspicious” through big data tools and
data tracking systems, and when individuals are categorized as “guilty
until proven innocent” through big data-generated inferential guilt. It
contends that big data blacklisting harms are not just procedural in
nature—that the government has failed to offer proper procedures for
remediation of these harms—but that big data dataveillance systems may
obstruct fundamental liberty interests. It poses the following question:
whether freedom from big data blacklisting harms should be protected as
a cognizable fundamental liberty interest under substantive due process.
In seeking to critique the constitutional impact of multiple big data
programs collectively, this Article attempts to identify a constitutionally
Powers, YALE L.J. 1672, 1679 (2012) (“The distinctive aspect of modern ‘substantive due
process’ . . . is its treatment of natural liberty as inviolate, even as against prospective and general
laws passed by the legislature and enforced by means of impeccable procedures.”).
336. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 1, at 508 (“If the state seeks to take an individual’s liberty or
property, it must generally ensure that he has notice of the basis for its action and a meaningful
opportunity to defend himself.”).
337. Fallon, supra note 67, at 314 (“[G]overnment intrusions on so-called ‘fundamental’
rights are subject to ‘strict’ or exacting scrutiny, a test sometimes formulated as inquiring whether
a burden is necessary to promote a ‘compelling state interest.’” (citing, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana,
112 S. Ct. 1780, 1804 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S.
678, 684–91 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973))).
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cognizable harm across the multiple big data blacklisting programs
discussed. Additionally, because the traditional legal framework guiding
due process analysis is often equipped to handle discrete harms that stem
from individualized government programs and specific administrative
procedures, it may seem counterintuitive to analyze multiple programs
collectively. This Article argues that because big data blacklisting harms
have not been legally conceptualized, yet implicate a mass societal harm
that threatens fundamental liberty interests, a legal framework that
possesses the capacity to analyze and address these new harms
collectively is needed. I reserve for future scholarship a more detailed
treatment of individual big data blacklisting programs and the application
of the due process inquiry more specifically.
Finally, more empirical evidence, programmatic transparency, and
evaluative protocols are needed to assess the sources and specific nature
of the unreliability of nonclassified and classified or semi-classified
government big data programs. To more fully assess the nature of big
data blacklisting, further interrogation is necessary to examine the multidimensional and significant long-term consequences of the government’s
increasing reliance on big data policymaking and algorithmic
intelligence, and the impact of this reliance on procedural and substantive
due process rights.338 Core liberties may be obstructed in a way that is
rapidly evolving and systemic, however, nearly impossible to detect
because of the opacity and complexity of big data technologies, and the
administrative systems that support them. Consequently, fundamental
liberty interests are implicated by big data blacklisting in a way that now
necessitates an evolution of the due process jurisprudence.

338. See, e.g., Citron & Pasquale, The Scored Society, supra note 13, at 27 (“In constructing
strategies for technological due process in scoring contexts, it is helpful to consider the sort of
notice individuals are owed when governmental systems make adverse decisions about them.
Under the Due Process Clause, notice must be ‘reasonably calculated’ to inform individuals of
the government’s claims against them.”) (citing Dusenbery v. United States, 534 U.S. 161, 168
(2002)); Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note 28, at 1276–77 (“[A]gencies must
recognize and address the ways in which automation undermines the procedural safeguards
typically attached to individual adjudications and rulemaking under the Due Process Clauses of
the Constitution and federal and state law[.]”) (citation omitted); Fairfield & Luna, supra note 36,
at 994 (arguing in favor of stronger procedural protections for criminal defendants by recognizing
the potential exonerating value of Big Data evidence: “What is needed now is . . . an understanding
of Big Data and mass government surveillance, and an evaluation of the legal consequences for
the actually innocent”); Manta & Robertson, supra note 62, at 1 (arguing that “courts should
incorporate elements of substantive due process by applying a unified due process standard that
requires a higher evidentiary burden—and real evidence of national security benefits—before the
government may curtail significant individual liberties”).
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Examples of U.S. Citizens Alleging Erroneous Work
Opportunity Deprivation from Database Screening

Name

Citizenship

Juan Carlos
Ochoa339

Naturalized U.S. Car dealership employee341
Citizen since
2000, Resident
of Arizona340

Occupation

Jessica St.
Pierre343

U.S. Citizen,
Resident of
Florida344

Employee at a
telecommunications
company345

John Doe I347

U.S. Citizen,
Resident of
Ohio348

Former captain in the U.S.
Navy with thirty-four years
of service349

Consequences
E-Verify search resulted in an erroneous
TNC apparently because the U.S. State
Department never notified SSA of his
change in status. His employer fired him
and his electricity was shut off because
he could not pay the bill. Allegedly paid
over $400 to secure a new naturalization
certificate to clear his name in databases
used by the E-Verify database screening
system.342
Employment termination due to an EVerify TNC error that could not be
resolved. After three months of
unemployment, she attained a new job
with “significantly lower pay.” Later,
with the aid of the National Immigration
Law Center, she discovered that the
problem occurred allegedly because “the
employer had placed two spaces after
[her] last name” when entering the
information into the E-Verify database
screening system.346
Despite history of high military security
clearance, data error required a twomonth investigation with the assistance
of an attorney to resolve erroneous EVerify TNC.350

339. David Bier, Why Everyone Should Fear E-Verify, HUFFINGTON POST (July 13, 2012, 11:57
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-bier/why-everyone-should-fear-e-verify_b_161005
7.html.
340. Id.
341. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., HOW ERRORS IN E-VERIFY DATABASES IMPACT U.S.
CITIZENS AND LAWFULLY PRESENT IMMIGRANTS 1 (2011), available at http://www.nilc.org/
document.html?id=337.
342. Id.
343. ACLU, PROVE YOURSELF TO WORK: THE 10 BIG PROBLEMS WITH E-VERIFY (2013),
available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/everify_white_paper.pdf.
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., supra note 341, at 1, 4 n.2.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 1.
350. Id.
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Jane Doe I351

U.S. Citizen,
Resident of
Florida352

Francisco
Romero355

Naturalized
U.S. Citizen
since 1996,
Resident of
Arizona356

Ken Nagel359

U.S. Citizen,
Resident of
Arizona360

Jane Doe II363 U.S. Citizen,
Resident of
Oklahoma364

Jane Doe III367 U.S. Citizen,
Resident of
California368
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id. at 2.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Employee at a national
Erroneous E-Verify TNC notice
department store chain353 resulted because employee “recently
remarried and changed her name.”
SSA office informed her that the
matter was resolved; however, when
she returned to work, she was
informed that DHS had directed the
employer to terminate her
employment because employer
claimed that the database screening
result indicated that “[she was]
suspected as a terrorist.”354
Construction worker357 Employee fired twice from
construction jobs because “E-Verify
failed to confirm his employment
eligibility.” He was “only able to
return to work after a community
advocate took on his case and
located the source of the E-Verify
TNC error.”358
Restaurant Owner361
Mr. Nagel expressed his concerns
over the accuracy of E-Verify after
he hired one of his daughters, a
native-born U.S. citizen, and upon
entering her personally identifiable
data into the database screening
system, received an erroneous EVerify TNC regarding her
employment eligibility.362
Nursing Home
Potential employer rescinded job
employment applicant365 offer because employee received an
erroneous E-Verify TNC, and the
nursing home allegedly decided to
hire someone else.366
Searching for a job using Informed by an employment agency
an employment services that there were several employers
that would be interested in hiring

1802

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

company369

John Doe II371 U.S. Citizen,
Resident of
Colorado372

Engineer373
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her based on her extensive work
history. However, employment
agency later informed her that she
could not obtain a job because she
received an erroneous TNC from EVerify.370
Employee received an erroneous
TNC and staffing agency revoked
job until SSA corrected the error.
After SSA corrected the error, the
agency could not locate comparable
work for the employee.374

Appendix B. Examples of U.S. Citizens Claiming Erroneous Voter List
Purging Based Upon Database Screening
State

Criteria Used to
Purge Voters

Virginia375

State election
officials attempted
to purge nearly
40,000 voters
weeks before
election day
because names
showed up in a
database as
registered in more
than one state.376

General Results of
Database
Screening
Of the 38,870
names that were
purged, many were
later found to be
the result of
database matching
errors. Many voters
on the purge list
had actually
registered in
Virginia more
recently than the
other state. Thus,
voters were eligible
to vote in Virginia.

Examples of Wrongly Purged
U.S. Citizens
“County registrars say hundreds
of eligible voters have been
removed and complain they’ve
been strong-armed into moving
ahead too quickly.” Lawrence
Haake III, the Chesterfield
County registrar and a
Republican, joined an affidavit
filed by Democrats against the
Republican Attorney General,
calling the list of 2200 names he
had received to be purged
“clearly inaccurate and
unreliable.”378

377

Mississippi379

369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Madison County
election
commissioner
secretly purged
more than 10,000

Id.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Roth, supra note 252.
Id.
Id.
Id.
PÉREZ, supra note 251, at 21.

The violation was
discovered a week
before the
Mississippi U.S.
presidential

The government removed a
Republican congressional
candidate in the upcoming
election, his wife, and his
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residents from voter
roll via her home
computer based
upon database
screening.380

Georgia383

Muscogee County,
Georgia, attempted
to purge 700 voters
from voter rolls
because election
officials believed
purged voters were
convicted felons.384

primary in March
2008. The purge
included recent
voters in November
2007 elections. The
state attempted to
correct purge errors
before the
election.381
Over a third of the
700 voters called to
report that the letter
they received
informing them of
the purge was a
mistake.385

1803

daughter from the voter rolls.382

A computer program that
matched names of felons to
names of voters generated the
list used by the county;
however, the program used no
other identifying information
other than the database name to
support conclusion that voter
was a felon.386

Appendix C. Examples of U.S. Citizens Claiming Erroneous
Detention, Deportation and Database Screening
Name
Mark Lyttle387

Citizenship
U.S. citizen born in
North Carolina388

Detention or Deportation
Lyttle screened through SCOMM database twice.
Lyttle filed lawsuit against
DHS for wrongful
deportation.389

Consequences
Deported to Mexico.
Removed from the United
States in December of
2008. Crossed border on
foot with only three
dollars, and wandered
through Mexico,
Honduras, Nicaragua, and
Guatemala for 125 days
before being referred to a
U.S. consular office that
confirmed his citizenship.
Lyttle does not speak
Spanish.390

380. Id.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 22.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Esha Bhandari, Yes, the U.S. Wrongfully Deports Its Own Citizens, ACLU (Apr. 25,
2013, 11:45 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/yes-us-wrongfully-deports-itsown-citizens.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
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Jakadrien
Turner391

U.S. citizen born in
Texas392

Arrested for shoplifting in
Houston, and she gave a
false name that matched the
name of an undocumented
immigrant in the database.
Although her fingerprints
did not match the false
name, the government still
deported her.393

Antonio
Montejano395

U.S. Citizen, resident S-COMM led ICE to
of California396
believe Montejano was an
undocumented
immigrant.397
“[I]mmigration officials
had failed once before to
recognize his citizenship,
mistakenly deporting him
to Mexico in 1996. His
records were not
corrected.”398
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Deported to Colombia.
Turner was fifteen years
old at the time of the
deportation; lived in
Colombia for almost one
year before her
grandmother located her.
Ms. Turner does not speak
Spanish.394

Police arrested and charged
Montejano with shoplifting.
He had purchased $600 worth
of merchandise but forgot to
pay for candy his children
had eaten while in the store
and a $10 bottle of perfume
that had failed to scan at the
register.399 A Los Angeles
county judge ordered his
release from jail, but he
remained detained due to an
immigration hold.400 Detained
for four days in jail by orders
of ICE until his citizenship
was proven.401 He was
released from prison after the
ACLU delivered his passport
and birth certificate to ICE.
402

391. Julianne Hing, How Did 15-Year-Old Jakadrien Turner, a U.S. Citizen, Get Deported?,
COLORLINES (Jan. 11, 2012, 9:53 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2012/01/how_did_
jakadrien_turner_a_us_citizen_get_deported.html.
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. E.J. Tamara, Secure Communities Program Arrested U.S. Citizens: Report, HUFFINGTON
POST (Dec. 15, 2011, 10:37 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/15/secure-communitiesus-citizens-arrested_n_1150877.html; see also Keith Rushing, SCOMM Leads to Jailing of
Another U.S. Citizen, RIGHTS WORKING GRP. (Dec. 16, 2011, 11:58 AM),
http://www.rightsworkinggroup.org/content/scomm-leads-jailing-another-us-citizen.
396. Tamara, supra note 395.
397. Id.
398. Julia Preston, Immigration Crackdown Also Snares Americans, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/us/measures-to-capture-illegal-aliens-nab-citizens
.html.
399. Tamara, supra note 395.
400. Id.
401. Simone Wilson, Antonio Montejano, U.S. Citizen and L.A. Dad, Detained for Days on
‘Immigration Hold,’ LA WEEKLY (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.laweekly.com/informer/2011/
12/14/antonio-montejano-us-citizen-and-la-dad-detained-for-days-on-immigration-hold.
402. Tamara, supra note 395.
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James
Makowski403

Makowski became a
naturalized U.S.
citizen at the age of
one, but the
government did not
update his
immigration records,
according to his
lawyer.404
Born in India and
adopted by a U.S.
family when he was
four months old.405

Jose
Velazquez410

U.S. citizen411

1805

S-COMM led ICE to
believe Makowski was
anundocumented
immigrant.406

Makowski was
“incorrectly
identified . . . as an illegal
immigrant and authorities
ordered him detained in a
maximum-security
prison.”407 Detained for
two months. “Mr.
Makowski was accepted
into the U.S. Marines in
2004 and underwent an
FBI check as part of that
process. Nevertheless,
DHS never updated its
records to reflect Mr.
Makowski’s
citizenship.”408
Filed lawsuit against the
FBI and DHS.409
S-COMM led ICE to
U.S. citizen wrongfully
believe Velasquez was an detained in Los Angeles
undocumented immigrant. County.413
412

Romy Campos414 Dual citizen of
United States and
Spain, born in
Florida415

Once entered the U.S. on
her Spanish passport,
which triggered the SCOMM database.416

Nineteen-year-old college
student who spent four
days in jail on an
immigration detainer
following a misdemeanor
charge.417

403. U.S. Citizen Sues FBI and DHS for Unlawful Imprisonment Due to Secure Communities,
NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. (July 3, 2012), http://www.immigrantjustice.org/press_releases/
us-citizen-sues-fbi-and-dhs-unlawful-imprisonment-due-secure-communities [hereinafter U.S.
Citizen Sues].
404. Id.
405. Brian Bennett, Citizen Sues over Imprisonment Under Fingerprint-Sharing Program,
L.A. TIMES (July 6, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jul/06/nation/la-na-securecommunities-20120706.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. U.S. Citizen Sues, supra note 403.
409. Id.
410. Velasquez was reportedly going to join Antonio Montejano in a lawsuit over their
incarceration. See Tamara, supra note 395.
411. Id.
412. See id.
413. Id.
414. Preston, supra note 398.
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. Id.
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Andres Robles418 U.S. citizen that
acquired derived
citizenship when his
father, a U.S. citizen,
was naturalized in
2002.419

Geraldo
Gonzales, Jr. 423

Hector Veloz427
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Law enforcement
paperwork allegedly
contained errors, possibly
leading to a positive match
in S-COMM.420

Deported to Mexico in
2011.421 Received a letter
in Mexico stating that the
U.S. government would
issue a certificate of
citizenship; however, was
required to retrieve letter
in person in the United
States. He was unable to
do so because he was
erroneously deported.
Filed lawsuit against
DHS.422
U.S. citizen born in When arrested in
When he became eligible
California424
December 2012 on a drug for release from drug
charge, arrest report
charge, he attempted to
erroneously stated he was post bail and learned that
born in Mexico.425
he was on an immigration
hold by ICE, despite
ICE’s lack of authority to
detain U.S. citizens.426
Born in Mexico, but Arrested in 2006 when he After nine months in jail,
U.S. citizen by birth: bought a stolen car. ICE
an Arizona judge declared
father is a U.S.
did not believe he was a
that he was a U.S. citizen
citizen who was
U.S. citizen because his
and ordered release. ICE
serving in Vietnam, parents had never obtained appealed the ruling, and
mother went to stay a certificate of citizenship he remained in jail for
at family’s house in for him.429
five more months.430
Mexico while she
was pregnant.428

418. Alex Nowrasthe, Commentary: Mistaken Deportation of Texas Teen Highlights the
Rigid, Incompetent Immigration Bureaucracy, HOUS. CHRON. BLOG (Jan. 6, 2012),
http://blog.chron.com/txpotomac/2012/01/commentary-mistaken-deportation-of-texas-teen-high
lights-the-rigid-incompetent-immigration-bureaucracy/.
419. Id.
420. See Jacqueline Stevens, How ICE Deported Another U.S. Citizen, Andres Robles Still
in Mexico, STATES WITHOUT NATIONS BLOG (July 27, 2011, 1:15 PM), http://stateswithoutnations
.blogspot.com/2011/07/how-ice-deported-another-us-citizen.html.
421. Nowrasthe, supra note 418.
422. Id.
423. Aura Bogado, Why Is This US-Born Citizen Being Detained by ICE?, NATION (June 21,
2013, 10:52 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/174921/why-us-born-citizen-being-detainedice#.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Tyche Hendricks, U.S. Citizens Wrongly Detained, Deported by ICE, SF GATE (July
27, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/U-S-citizens-wrongly-detaineddeported-by-ICE-3291041.php.
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id.
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Ocampo431
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U.S. citizen, derived No explanation for the
citizenship in 2002 mistaken detention.433
from his mother’s
naturalization432

1807

ICE came to Ocampo’s
home and arrested him,
reportedly based on
database hit after he had
been convicted of other
crimes. Despite providing
necessary documentation
to prove citizenship,
including his mother’s
naturalization
information, detained for
several days.434

Appendix D. Examples of U.S. Citizens and Lawful Immigrants
Challenging Erroneous Placement on No Fly List Based upon Digital
Watchlisting and Database Screening435

Name
State
Ibraheim (Abe) Illinois437
436
Mashal

Amayan Latif440 Georgia441
Mohamed Sheikh Oregon445
Abdirahman

Kariye444

Occupation
U.S. Marine
Corps veteran
and owner of a
dog training
business438
U.S. Marine
Corps veteran442
N/A

Consequences
Lost business clients due to his inability to
fly. Unable to travel to family events such
as his sister-in-law’s graduation and to
fundraising events for the nonprofit
organization that he founded. 439
Lost his veteran disability benefits because
he could not attend scheduled evaluations
required for benefits.443
Could not fly to visit his daughter who is
studying in Dubai and cannot fly to
accompany his mother on a hajj
pilgrimage.446

431. See Jacqueline Stevens, ICE Kidnaps Another US Citizen in Springfield, Illinois,
STATES WITHOUT NATIONS BLOG (June 21, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://stateswithoutnations.blogspot
.com/2012/06/ice-kidnaps-another-us-citizen-in.html.
432. Id.
433. See id.
434. Id.
435. In 2012, according to a spokesman for the TSC, the number of U.S. citizens on the list
remains “‘very small’ and relatively stable, at 500.” Stone, supra note 297.
436. Federal Court Sides with ACLU in No Fly List Lawsuit, ACLU (Aug. 29, 2013),
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/federal-court-sides-aclu-no-fly-list-lawsuit.
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. See id.
440. Latif v. Holder, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1298 (D. Or. 2013).
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id. Latif was unable to return to the United States and remained in Egypt for six months
because the government did not allow him to board a flight home. Id. In October 2010, the
Egyptian government granted him a “one-time waiver” to fly to the United States. Id.
444. Id. at 1298–99.
445. Id.
446. Id.
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Raymond Earl
Knaeble IV447

Illinois448
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U.S. Army
veteran449

Job offer rescinded because he was unable
to fly home for required medical
examination. Prevented from returning
home after visiting his wife’s family in
Columbia. Eventually resorted to traveling
for twelve days through Mexico to
California to return home.450

U.S. Air Force
veteran453

Returned to United States by taking a series
of five flights from Ireland to Mexico, and
then by crossing the U.S. border on foot.
Unable to see wife since May 2010 because
she is unable to obtain a visa to fly to the
United States.454

N/A

Unable to travel to Yemen in 2012 to attend
brother’s funeral and cannot visit his
extended family.457

Amir Meshal458 Minnesota459

N/A

Could not visit his mother and extended
family in Egypt. Allegedly offered the
opportunity to serve as an informant in
exchange for removal from the No Fly
List.460

Stephen Durga California462
Persaud461

N/A

Five-day boat trip from St. Thomas to
Miami and a four-day train ride from
Miami to Los Angeles to be present for the
birth of his second child. Cannot travel to
perform hajj pilgrimage.463

Steven William New
Washburn451
Mexico452

Salah Ali
Ahmed455

447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.

Georgia456

Id. at 1299.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1299–1300.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id at 1301.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Virginia465

Kevin Iraniha468 California469

Muhammed
Tanvir472

New York473
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Student who
studied in
Yemen for
eighteen
months466

Questioned in Egypt for six weeks before
receiving a one-time waiver to return home.
The Virginia native reported that the FBI
asked him to be an informant in the Muslim
American community.467

Student with a
masters degree in
International
Law470

Prevented from flying home from his
graduate studies in Costa Rica. Forced to
travel to Mexico and cross into the United
States by land. After questioning, the FBI
allegedly asked him to be an informant.471
Allegedly offered the opportunity to serve
as an informant in exchange for removal
from the No Fly List.475

Lawful
permanent
resident474

464. Ian Shapira, U.S. Citizen on No-Fly List Discusses Being Stranded in Egypt and Talks
with FBI, WASH. POST (July 27, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/07/26/AR2010072605404.html.
465. Id.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Shirin Sadeghi, U.S. Citizen Put on No-Fly List to Pressure Him into Becoming FBI
Informant, HUFFINGTON POST (June 7, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/shirinsadeghi/kevin-iraniha-no-fly-list_b_1579208.html.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id.
472. Hunter Stuart, Muhammed Tanvir, New York Man, Put on No-Fly List After Refusing to
Spy for FBI, Lawsuit Says, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 7, 2013, 11:05 AM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2013/10/04/fbi-spy-no-fly-list-lawsuit-muslims-_n_4045791.html.
473. Id.
474. Id.
475. Id.

